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ABSTRACT
EXPLORATION OF THE CURRENT STATE AND DIRECTIONS OF DYNAMIC
RIDSHAREING
by Joseph J. Di Gianni
Dynamic ridesharing (DRS) is an emerging transportation service based on the
traditional concept of shared rides. DRS makes use of web-based real-time technologies
to match drivers with riders. Enabling technologies include software platforms that
operate on mobile communication devices and contain location-aware capabilities
including Global Positioning Systems (Agatz, Erera, Savelsberg, & Wang, 2012). The
platforms are designed to provide ride-matching services via smartphone applications
differing from early systems that used non-real time services such as internet forums, or
telecommunications, where responses were not immediate.
The study of DRS is important when considering its role as an emerging
transportation demand management strategy. DRS reduces travel demand on singleoccupancy vehicles (SOVs) by filling vehicle seats that are typically left vacant. The
most recent statistics of vehicle occupancy rates were measured in 2009 by the National
Household Travel Survey (NHTS), conducted by the U.S. Department of Transportation.
According to the NHTS, the 2009 occupancy rate for all purposes was a meager 1.67
persons per vehicle (Federal Highway Administration, 2015). Vehicle occupancy rates
examined against the total of all registered highway vehicles in the U.S. as of 2012,
calculated at 253,639,386 (Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2015), reveals the
magnitude of the impact of SOVs. Left unattended, the ramifications for environmental
iv

outcomes is substantial. Among the major energy consuming sectors, transportation's
share is largest in terms of total CO2 emissions at 32.9% (Davis, Diegel, & Boundy,
2014, p. 11-15).
DRS offers promise to fill empty vehicle seats. Evidence indicates that specific
demographic subgroups are inclined to use DRS services. For example, data suggest that
the subgroup of 18 to 34-year-olds, the so-called "millennials", have negative attitudes
towards private car ownership unlike previous age groups (Nelson, 2013). Data collected
for this study revealed that the millennial subgroup represents half of all DRS users.
Millennials also revealed they tended to use DRS more than other subgroups to replace a
private vehicle. Further research is needed to determine if the trend towards DRS by 18
to 34-year-olds represents current economic factors or a fundamental cultural shift away
from the SOV transportation model.
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CHAPTER 1
1. Introduction
Each day in North America fixed capacity roads become filled with cars, trucks,
and buses as demand volumes rise with resultant slower speeds and frequently stopped
traffic. At the same time, unused capacity remains idle in the form of unoccupied seats in
millions of passenger cars. Utilizing those empty seats can contribute to reducing vehicle
emissions, lowering fuel usage, and creating socioeconomic opportunities from
productivity gained through the efficient use of the transportation system. Currently,
carpooling is the primary method used to fill empty seats in private vehicles (NHTS,
2009). Major barriers to greater adoption of carpooling, however, have kept its
contribution to the overall transportation matrix at low levels (Chan & Shaheen, 2012).
Major barriers include issues of private space, conflicting schedules, increased travel time
allotted for pick-up and drop-off of passengers, and safety risks to both persons and
property (Ferguson, 1997). Despite these barriers carpooling takes place as evidenced by
recent U.S. Census data indicating that twice as many people use carpooling in a private
vehicle to commute to work than those who use public transportation (Davis, Diegel, &
Boundy , pp. 8-20, 2013). With the relative success of carpooling in mind, this study
aims to examine a form of trip sharing known as dynamic ridesharing (DRS) which
promises to overcome barriers to carpooling and increase the number of occupied seats
utilized in private vehicles.
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DRS is an emerging automated process facilitated by an online provider that
matches drivers with riders in real-time (Agatz, Erera, Savelsberg, & Wang, 2012). The
matching provider, generally a software company, uses information, communication, and
location-aware technologies in the form of Internet-enabled smartphones and social
media websites such as Facebook to match riders with drivers in real-time usually within
minutes before the trip takes place (Agatz, et. al, 2012). These enabling technologies are
at the heart of renewed interest in DRS, also known as real-time ridesharing. Software
companies facilitating DRS are the newest innovation being considered by consumers
and are emerging quickly driven by rapidly changing enabling technologies (Deakin,
Frick, & Shivley, 2011). Hence, transportation planners are re-examining DRS's potential
benefits to reduce traffic congestion and automotive emissions despite an overall 10%
decline in the rate of carpooling within the last 30 years (Table 1) (Furuhata, Dessouky,
Ordóñez, Brunet, Wang, & Koenig, 2013). Currently, the modal share for carpooling in
Canada and the U.S. is approximately 8 to 11%, respectively (Chan & Shaheen, 2012).
Table 2.1: Transportation to Work 1980-2011: Drove alone vs. car pooled and
transit
Means of Transportation to Work, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2011

Means of
transportation

1980 Census
Number of
workers
1,000s Share

81,258
84.1%
Private vehicle
62,193
64.4%
Drove alone
19,065
19.7%
Car pooled
Public transport
6,175
6.4%
Sources: Davis, et al, 2013, p. 8-20.

1990 Census
Number of
workers
1,000s Share

2000 Census
Number of
workers
1,000s Share

2011 ACS
Number of
workers
1,000s Share

99,593
84,215
15,378

86.5%
73.2%
13.4%

112,736
97,102
15,635

87.9%
75.7%
12.2%

120,316
106,139
14,177

86.3%
76.1%
10.2%

6.070

5.3%

6,068

4.7%

6,914

5.0%
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1.1 Distinguishing dynamic ridesharing services from non-dynamic services.
DRS differs from regular ridesharing, also known as carpooling, in that it is an adhoc service arranging single shared rides on short notice (Amey, Attanucci, & Mishalani,
2011). Regular ridesharing has had a primarily temporal dependence on commuting
where participants agree to a recurring long-term schedule of planned shared rides.
Regular ridesharing, or carpooling, may be organized by an employer or governmental
agency who supply a match-list for participants to arrange rides with common origins and
destinations. This can be done in some conventional ways such providing lists of
potential participants on a website with contact information or government sponsored call
centers initiating matches via telephone. Informal carpooling can also be initiated by coworkers making arrangements for rides based on current mutual needs. In the 1990s,
carpooling was also a component of the Clean Air Act of 1990 that was intended to
reduce vehicle air emissions.
There is another variation of informal carpooling known as casual carpooling or
slugging, which is an ad-hoc form of rideshare initiated by commuters at Park and Rides
or large employment centers such as the Pentagon in the northern Virginia suburbs of
Washington, DC. Slugging is motivated by a commuter's incentive to use the faster
moving High Occupancy Vehicle lanes or to reduce daily costs of tolls and fuel. Slugging
is effective in reducing the number of vehicles per lane during peak demand periods (Ma
& Wolfson, 2013). Slugging differs from DRS in that the participants meet in-person and
make informal arrangements for fuel and toll payments.
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Finally, DRS should not be confused with car-sharing organizations that provide
members access to shared vehicles via a reservation system similar to the car rental
company model (Shaheen, Cohen, & Chung, 2009). Car-sharing companies like Zipcar
and Hertz on Demand differ from dynamic ridesharing in that users are committed to a
specific rental period, and it does not discouraged single-occupancy vehicle (SOV) use
(Figure 1.1). Car-sharing has had some success as Cervero, Golub, and Nee (2007)
noted, that 30 percent of households participating in a car-sharing program either avoided
or postponed car ownership and used other modes more often such as transit, bicycling,
and walking.

Figure 1.1: Zipcar, a subsidiary of Avis Car Rental Company, is a car-sharing
company that allows members to pay a fee for access to various vehicles, depending
on the driver's needs. (Source: John DiGianni)
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1.2 Background
Carpooling has been part of the transportation planner's toolbox since the midtwentieth century, however, it has received new attention due to a convergence with
advanced information and communication technologies (ICTs) over the last two decades
(Siddiqi & Buliung, 2013). High-speed broad band access to the Internet offering realtime delivery of information over location-aware mobile devices are the enabling factors
that are defining DRS as a new paradigm for sustainable transportation. A paradigm shift
can be seen in the roles of the different stakeholders who are creating a convergence
between ICTs, automobile manufacturers, and software developers along with end user
confidence all of which are leading to the current proliferation of DRS providers (Siddiqi
& Buliung, 2013). Automobile companies have already indicated the potential economic
harm that DRS presents to the industry. However, some companies such as Daimler have
been very supportive of DRS research (Ecosummit TV, 2014).
DRS is linked to carpooling in that it matches drivers with riders while reducing
the use of single-occupant vehicles (SOVs). In a DRS scenario, however, non-recurring
trips are arranged between participants in real-time using an Android or Apple
smartphone (Figure 1.2) or social media website such as Facebook (Figure 1.3) on a pertrip basis (Levofsky & Greenberg, 2001). Both riders and drivers must be registered with
a matching provider via a software application on their smartphone or through a social
media website. When a request for a ride is made a database is searched for potential
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drivers and riders using high-dimensional matching that analyzes multiple parameters
such as proximity, pricing, and trust and reputation systems (Furuhata, et al., 2013).

Figure 1.2: Left, Android 4.3 home screen. Right, Apple iOS7 home screen. (Source:
Author)
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Figure 1.3 : Facebook webpage for a DRS service.( Source: Lyft, 2014)

The ICT convergence has enabled much of the recent success of DRS, however,
lingering challenges regarding personal safety have also been addressed. For example,
the use of trust and reputation systems, another unique feature of DRS is similar to user
rating systems employed by online retailers eBay and Amazon. In a DRS arranged ride,
trust and reputation systems are used by both the driver and the rider who must rate the
experience at the end of the transaction (Furuhata, et al., 2013). Other layers of added
security include mandatory criminal and motor vehicle background checking conducted
by the match provider that solves some of the traditional carpooling resistance that riders
have to sharing trips with strangers. Furthermore, match providers make available
liability insurance to lessen participant anxiety over any legal issues that might arise in
the event of an accident (Figure 1.4).
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Figure 1.4: Insurance policy infographic (screen capture) for DRS provider Lyft.
(Source: Lyft, 2014)
It has become increasingly difficult to ignore the transportation sector's
contribution to Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions, lost economic productivity due to
traffic congestion, and dependency on imported oil. Despite public policy promoting
mass transit and traditional carpooling most programs have failed to achieve a substantial
modal share especially in low-density automobile-oriented urban areas (Levofsy &
Greenberg, 2001). Among the major energy consuming sectors, transportation's share of
total CO2 emissions is largest at 31.7% (Table 1.2) (Davis, et al., pp. 11-5, 2013).
Strategies to reduce transportation's emissions are most often focused on regulating travel
demand which at a rudimentary level are the decisions made regarding when and how to
reach places such as centers of employment, entertainment, etc. (Cervero & Kockelman,
1997).
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Table 1.2: Transportation's share of total GHG emissions.
Total U.S. Greenhouse Emissions by End-Use Sector, 2011
(million metric tons carbon dioxide equivalent)

Carbon dioxide

Residential
Commercial
Agricultural
Industrial
Transportation
Transportation share of total

Methane

Nitrous oxide

Hydrofluro-carbons,
perfluro-carbons,
sulfur hexafluoride

Total
greenhouse
gas
emissions

1,131.8

3.7

9.2

25.2

1,169.9

966.2

121.9

13.5

29.4

1,131.0

123.7

210.6

278.1

0.2

612.6

1,575.2

249.6

39.1

33.3

1,897.2

1,758.3

1.4

16.9

57.1

1,833.7

31.7%

0.2%

4.7%

39.3%

27.6%

587.2

356.8

145.2

6,644.4

Total greenhouse gas emissions 5,555.2

Source: Davis, et al, 2013, p. 11-5.
Transportation demand management (TDM) policies in the U.S. have traditionally
involved strategies aimed at reducing such demand by inducing drivers to shift from
SOVs to high-occupancy modes such as carpooling and mass transit (Black & Schreffler,
2010). Other recent strategies have included bike-sharing, such as the Citi Bike program,
a privately managed public bicycle sharing program in New York (Citi Bike, 2015)
(Figure 1.5). Citi Bike users purchase passes from a street pay station that deducts fees
electronically based on the period of use.
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DRS in practice reduces the number of vehicles per lane of roadway, thus it
qualifies as a TDM strategy aimed at reducing oil dependency, consumption, and traffic
congestion. All are promising goals. However, the degree of these benefits is still unclear
and requires further research (Chan & Shaheen, 2012).

Figure 1.5: A Citi Bike station in Manhattan. (Source: John DiGianni)
Saddiqi and Buliung (2013) examined the historical progress of DRS from a
technological perspective highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of ICTs from the
period of the 1970s oil crises which relied on early Bulletin Board Systems then available
only at universities and large governmental agencies, into the present mass adoption of
smartphones beginning in the late 2000s with devices like the Blackberry, iPhone, and
Android. Surveys such as those conducted by Buliung, Bui, & Lanyon (2012) have
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shown that the temporal regularity of commuting, i.e. journey-to-work, is influential in
the successful formation of carpooling programs. It is often the work commute that
receives the most focus for this very reason, however, recent evidence suggests that the
highest person miles of travel (PMT) have shifted from commuting to personal trips, e.g.
shopping, visiting, entertainment, etc. (NHTS, 2009). While there has been much
research on commuting and carpooling, there has been relatively little empirical research
on DRS other than anecdotal evidence suggesting it often used outside of the work trip.
Chan & Shaheen (2012) provided a synopsis of ridesharing's history divided into
five key phases: (1) World War II car-sharing clubs intended to conserve resources, e.g.
rubber, fuel, steel, etc. (1942-45); (2) reactions to geopolitical events involving the
manipulation of oil markets, i.e. OPEC oil embargo, (1970s to 1980); (3) early employerbased ridesharing schemes focused on air quality and traffic reduction that relied on
telephone-based matching and employer incentives (1980-1997); (4) reliable ridesharing
systems that used early ICTs to provide matching services typically via websites or
traveler telephone information services, e.g. 511 phone travel information service (19992004); (5) Internet-enabled and location-aware real-time ridesharing based on incentives
held out by sustainable urban transportation initiatives (2004 to present).
From this overview one sees that ridesharing plays an important role in addressing
societal issues. Hence it is important to seize on the current renewed interest in the topic
for further study. To date, there has been little agreement on what constitutes an effective
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DRS program. The chief aim of this study is to identify the benefits and motivating
factors that attract users and, more importantly, characteristics for early adopters of DRS.
1.3 How dynamic ridesharing works- a primer.
Both drivers and passengers may initiate DRS by signing in through their
Facebook account or by downloading an application to their smartphone. Either of the
above access methods creates an account providing an interface where users post their
availability as drivers or passengers. In the case of drivers, the availability of seats in his
or her vehicle is posted along with a face picture and information identifying the vehicle
(e.g., a full image and license plate number). Riders open the application on their
smartphones and begin keying in a request for a vehicle via the software's interface.
Global Positioning Systems (GPS) built into the hardware and software of the
smartphone make the device location-aware, thus enabling real-time matching of
participants based on their proximity to each other. At this point, the service attempts to
match the rider to an available driver using an algorithm that accounts for distance and
time to the pick-up and drop-off points. The passenger sees on his or her smartphone
screen an estimated pick-up time as well as the fare for the ride. Payment is not handled
in-person but is processed through the smartphone's software application that contains the
passenger's credit card information. At the completion of the trip, the application requests
the passenger to provide a rating of the driver and overall service. Likewise, the driver is
also given an opportunity to rate the passenger on his or her device. A payment for

13

service is deducted from the rider's credit card with generally 80% of the fare going to the
driver and 20% to the matching provider (Lyft, 2014).
1.4 Tying dynamic ridesharing to Environmental Management
The present transportation system's capacity is not being utilized efficiently. The
phrase "transportation system" can mean many things, e.g. roads for private vehicles,
public transport vehicles (buses, vans, jitneys), heavy commuter rail, urban metros,
ferries, lanes and infrastructure dedicated bicycles, and more.
According to the U.S. Census Bureau's five year estimate (2009 to 2013), 106.7
million workers drove alone to work in a car, truck, or van (U.S. Census, 2015).
Assuming the average vehicle holds 5 passengers, these workers took with them the
potential to transport, 426.9 million people in their vehicle's empty seats. That's more
than the estimated 2015 U.S. population of 320 million people.
Seats that can be filled reduce road capacity, an environmentally beneficial
condition that can lead to: reduced traffic congestion, reduction of transportation sector's
impact on the environment, free flowing roadways without further need for infrastructure
investments, and increased work productivity.
1.5 Research Objectives
The overall structure of the study will take the form of four chapters, including
this introduction, with the chief aim of contributing new research for the transportation
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planning profession's understanding of DRS as a TDM method to reduce SOV use. This
study will examine three key research objectives:
1. Exploration and assessment of the directions that DRS has taken, and its
potential as a disrupting innovation to change the current urban
transportation system both nationally and globally.
2. A demographic examination of a sample of U.S. DRS users to understand
who are the early adopter consumers of DRS.
3. A qualitative assessment of leading DRS services in two premier cities,
San Francisco and New York, to compare and contrast issues. A
chronology of legal and administrative issues was used to determine the
similarities and difference of DRS development in each city.
Each research objectives will be explained in detail in the remainder of this section.
1.6 Organization of Thesis
Chapter 2. The objective of the first study examined the current state and direction of
DRS. The study introduces DRS in a historical context. DRS is explained within the
present-day context of SOV-driven automobility. Early car-sharing programs are
described, and then compared and contrasted with DRS to learn similarities and
differences. A history and description of DRS follows, with an explanation of how it
breaks with traditional transportation management strategies. The break with
transportation planning is witness by the convergence of DRS ICT. In the past,
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transportation engineers and planners formulated solutions to mobility problems within
their specific disciplines. DRS represents a break with that model.
The first study is titled "Explorations of the Current State and Directions in the
Emerging Field of Dynamic Ridesharing Platforms". The study was submitted and
published in the Middle States Geographer, Volume 47, 2014. The Middle States
Geographer is an official published journal of the Middle States Division of the
Association of American Geographers.
Chapter 3. The objective of the second study will be to explore the demographic
characteristics of the users of DRS. The approach to empirical research adopted for this
study will be quantitative based on a structured survey administered over the Internet to a
target audience of dynamic rideshare users. See the Appendix A for a reproduction of the
survey approved by the Montclair State University Institutional Research Board. The
target audience was a sample of 300 participants with a balance of male/female
responses. An online survey was administered, by SurveyMonkey, an Internet platform
that provides audiences and analysis of responses (SurveyMonkey, 2015). The
respondents were randomly chosen from all regions of the United States. Descriptive
statistics were used to explore user-driven motivations to use DRS, which was aimed at
providing opportunities for system improvements and expansion (Zmud & Rojo, 2013).
Technology-enabled DRS is the newest emerging innovation being adopted by
consumers, however little known about this evolving transportation mode. By examining
a segment of the population who have adopted DRS, we hope to understand if the new
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technology can provide alternatives to the predicament of SOV use. The purpose of this
study was to describe who the users of DRS are in urban areas and explain how they
came to choose this mode over other more established modes. The study was largely
descriptive in nature.
Chapter 4. The third research objective of this study will be a qualitative assessment of
the features of DRS in urban areas in order to compare and contrast features of each
application on the current market. DRS companies are emerging quickly driven by
technology that we have not had time to assess. Despite recent success, questions have
been raised about the viability of DRS in many cities due to economic and political pushback from traditional transportation companies such as taxis and airport limousine
services. Progressive states such as California have already made legal rulings on DRS
services and have giving them the name transportation network companies (TNCs) to
distinguish them from traditional transportation providers (Public Utilities Commission
of the State of California, 2012). A comparative study will be based on how each of the
leading DRS services address key issues such as optimization methods, pricing of
service, minimizing costs, maximizing passengers served, and most importantly their
success or failure at meeting legal challenges from traditional transportation companies
as well as challenges from state and local governments who are motivated to protect the
status quo .
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CHAPTER 2
Exploration of the Current State and Directions in the Emerging Field of Dynamic
Ridesharing Platforms
[This chapter was published in the journal Middle States Geographer, Volume 47, 2014]

Abstract
Automobility has advanced since the postwar decline of public transportation and
its near universal replacement by single-occupant vehicles (SOVs) throughout much of
the developed economies. Even so-called “transit friendly” economies of the Global
South have seen shifts in their modes of transportation to systems that are predominantly
SOV-based (Cervero, 2013). Intensive infrastructure expansion within emerging
economies indicates that the SOV is being adopted at a rate similar to the developed
economies of one hundred years ago. Henry Ford's quote “With mobility comes freedom
and progress” points to the concept that mobility becomes universally interpreted as
“automobility”. Grave concern is linked to the continuation of the SOV model and its
consequences for an environment taxed by an ever-expanding transportation sector. A
paradigm shift, however, in the SOV-driven model, has been detected coming not from
transportation but the different domains of information and communication technologies.
This review examined the current state and direction of dynamic ridesharing
(DRS), an emerging technology driven by recent technology innovations over the last
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two decades (Siddiqi & Buliung, 2013). DRS matches drivers and riders in real-time
using Internet and mobile technology, and are single-occurrence events organized on
short notice (Amey, Attanucci, & Mishalani, 2011). We include a case study of DRS
from its roots in San Francisco, CA. The city provides a present-day template for
emerging themes when DRS is introduced into the present-day urban transportation
system.
Keywords: dynamic ridesharing, mobile communications, Uber, Lyft, SideCar, taxis
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2. Introduction
Apart from safety and amenity advancements, little has changed in personal
mobility since the public transportation network was rendered secondary by postwar
business interests. Much of that network became universally replaced with single
occupancy vehicles (SOVs) (Snell,1995). Automobility focused on technological
advancements in amenities, fuel economy, and safety improvements and has been
pervasive even within the so-called "transit friendly" developing countries of the Global
South (Cervero, 2013). Intensive highway infrastructure expansion among the rising
economies has signaled their intention to replicate the developed world's SOV model
based on Henry Ford's motto “With mobility comes freedom and progress".
The year 2015 marks the 70th anniversary of a period of vast economic and social
upheaval following World War Two. Change was stimulated by the mass migration of
middle-income families from the central cities to the less expensive land of the suburbs
and concomitant monumental investments in infrastructure and highways. During the
automobility era, private vehicle ownership has been encouraged and welcomed as a
facilitator of opportunities for those once confined to housing within walking distance to
the nearest transit stop (Liepmann, 1944). This freedom has come at a cost in terms of
global environmental climate change enabled partly by rising vehicle emissions,
squandered resources, and productivity lost to SOVs idling in traffic. Among the major
energy consuming sectors, transportation's share of total CO2 emissions is largest at
32.9% (Davis, Diegel, & Boundy, 2014, p. 11-15).
The information and communication revolution in technology has changed many
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aspects of society, particularly in the retail and financial sectors. Information technology
has been slow in adapting to transportation systems. The arrival of Big Data, the massive
volume of both structured and unstructured information collected by ubiquitous sensors
as well as social media websites and global-positioning-system-enabled (GPS) mobile
devices, has at last come to transportation (Miller, 2013). A paradigm shift in
automobility in the developed and developing economies is still in its initial stages, but it
is rapidly altering common perceptions of private vehicle ownership and use.
A major activity behind this paradigm shift is a variant of carpooling known as
dynamic ridesharing (DRS). DRS is an emerging method of personal mobility based on
the traditional concept of ridesharing. DRS matches drivers with riders in real-time using
online technology platforms (Agatz, Erera, Savelsberg, & Wang, 2012). The platforms
provide matching services via smartphone applications that use information,
communication, and location-aware technologies to match drivers with riders in realtime. Drivers do not work for a technology company providing matching services, but are
instead independent contractors providing their vehicles to transport passengers
(Hubpages, 2014). The DRS platforms also offer a method of payment using a
smartphone, and in most cases peripheral services such as liability insurance and
background investigation of drivers (made available to quell concerns about personal
safety). The DRS companies earn income using a business model based on transactions
called an administrative fee that is typically 20% of the charge for the ride (Hubpages,
2014). The remaining 80 %of the fare is deposited electronically in a bank account
designated by the driver. The DRS platform sets the charge for the ride based on factors
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such as distance and whether the ride occurs during peak or off-peak hours.
DRS differs from traditional ridesharing since matches between drivers and riders
are arranged in real-time using mobile technology, are single-occurrence events and
organized on short notice usually within minutes before a ride (Amey, Attanucci, &
Mishalani, 2011). Traditional ridesharing, such as carpools and pre-arranged shared
vehicles, continue to be part of the transportation planner's toolbox. However, the toolbox
has expanded with recent advancements in information and telecommunication
technologies (ICT) that have allowed the evolution of DRS (Figure 2.1). DRS represents
a break with tradition in its lack of connection to the major regulation, transportation
planning, or engineering disciplines. Contemporary transportation demand management
(TDM) strategies designed to reduce traffic demand and SOV usage were policies
developed by transportation professionals such as traffic engineers and transportation
planner. DRS has similarly desired outcomes; however, it was conceived out of the
entirely different domain of information technology.

Figure 2.1: The evolution of ridesharing.
DRS proliferation has followed a predictable pattern established in San Francisco,
CA, its city of origination. That pattern is one of a disruptive innovation (Christensen,
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2003), occupying the newer value network of smartphone users, and ever poised to
invade the older value network of the taxi and limousine industry. Consequently, DRS
has pushed hard on the older taxi and limousine industry to the point where competitors
are attempting to fend off market erosion with similar technology with hopes of surviving
the current disruption (Christensen, 2003). Renewed interest in the concept of
ridesharing must be understood not as a sustaining innovation but as disruptive, with
potential to change all existing for-hire car markets. DRS focuses on the convergence
between information and communication technologies, GPS-enabled internet and mobile
devices (i.e., smartphones), and represents a new paradigm in transportation planning
(Siddiqi & Buliung, 2013).
2.1 Background
This review examined the emerging themes and changing aspects of the new DRS
technology into the classic urban transportation system. It focused on the current state of
the top three DRS platforms: UberX, Lyft, and SideCar. The platforms are the companies
creating the software that operates on smartphones and websites, and allows drivers and
riders to be matched in real-time. San Francisco was chosen as a case study because it the
origination point of ICT-enabled DRS and can be used to explore general directions that
DRS services take once they enter a market. San Francisco possessed a unique history
regarding the traditional taxi industry. Despite its unique underlying history, San
Francisco provides a basic formula for DRS adoption in cities across the world. On a
rudimentary level, each DRS platform offers a service matching riders with drivers using
similar software and hardware. Additionally, each DRS service has similar policies for
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transaction processing, providing automobile insurance, and plans for future expansion.
Variation occurs where each platform offers its own distinct brand of ridesharing that is
often reflected in the social media of individual offerings. Although there is an apparent
variation among cities and DRS platforms, there is a demonstrable pattern of DRS
adoption that follows the San Francisco case history.
The technology companies responsible for the development of smartphone
applications are at the heart of DRS. The leading platforms, UberX, Lyft, and SideCar,
each represents a prominent position in the current state of DRS. Uber is the largest
service offering the most choices in ridesharing spanning from luxury livery vehicles to
basic sedans. In all cases vehicles are driver-owned independent contractors who set their
own work schedules. Lyft is the next largest platform the primary competitor of Uber. In
order to compete directly with Uber, Lyft has been branching into specialty services such
as Lyft SUV, a service that provides larger vehicles, and Lyft Line, a service that uses a
program to match multiple riders in a single vehicle along an optimized route (Lyft,
2015). In third position, SideCar competes by offering fares lower than the two giants.
The DRS transport mode is developing quickly due to competition among the platforms
and the rapidly changing nature of enabling technologies. Hence, any thorough
cataloging of DRS platforms at this time will likely result in an outdated list (Deakin,
Frick, & Shivley, 2011).
2.2 The Dynamic Ridesharing Platforms
The sphere of DRS platforms is comprised of startups that have risen and fallen
quickly due to the rapidly evolving nature of their technology. Additionally, the nascent
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business model of DRS is still unrecognized by many regulators at state and municipal
levels. (Begley, 2014). Additional background on Uber, the parent of UberX was
provided to give context. Background was also provided for Zimride, the earlier iteration
of Lyft. The following sections give a brief overview of the histories and business
models of the prominent platforms, Uber/UberX, Lyft, and SideCar, as of 2015.
2.2.1 Uber and UberX
The breakthrough enabling technology needed to make ridesharing real-time
would be wedded to DRS at the 2008 Le Web Conference in Paris, a venue for European
entrepreneurs. Startup technologists Garret Camp and Travis Kalanick, met at the
conference and formed what was to become Uber, the present day behemoth of DRS
platforms. Both had recently completed start up deals and were reflecting on what could
be the next major disruptive innovation from Silicon Valley. Camp had suggested dealing
with the well-known problem of requesting a taxi in San Francisco. A victim of midtwentieth century deregulation and re-regulation, the taxi industry in San Francisco had
become synonymous with some of the most unpleasant aspects of that city's life
(Newsham, 2000). Camp and Kalanick devised a program, initially for their exclusive
use that would circumvent the taxi problem by using smartphones. An app on the iPhone
was developed to split the cost of a professional driver and a luxury black car to get
around San Francisco on-demand (Arrington, 2010). Upon returning to San Francisco,
the two began what could be called a "limo timeshare." They split the cost of a Mercedes
S Class limousine, a driver, and parking space in a city garage. Either could use the app
on his iPhone to summon the shared-limo without resorting to taxis to get around San
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Francisco. The developers soon realized that anyone with access to a smartphone and
appropriate software could use such a system to circumvent the historical problem of
getting around San Francisco by taxi. Hence, the final piece of the DRS puzzle,
developing a mobile device app, was developed by Camp in March of 2009. At the same
time, Kalanick prepared a prototype of the project that was tested in New York using
several cars in January, 2010.
Uber was officially launched as UberCab on May 31, 2010 on iPhone and
Android mobile devices in San Francisco. At its inception, UberCab offered only full-size
luxury vehicles based on the company’s original prototype that reflected private black
luxury car services offered in Lower Manhattan. The name “UberCab” was shortly
changed to “UberBlack” to conform to its black luxury car image. In December 2010,
Kalanick became CEO of Uber (Uber Blog, 2010). The management change reflected a
strategic transition from the successful launch to long term disruption strategy based on
Kalanick’s philosophy of DRS-driven industry change. In 2012, Kalanick threatened
industry disruption in the form a full attack on the local taxi and car-for-hire industry
with the launch of UberX, the platform's program of smaller non-luxury privately owned
vehicles driven by non-professional drivers, and at prices competitive with regular city
taxis (Flegenheimer, 2014). As will be shown in the case of San Francisco, industry
disruption can be positive and bring improvements to customers in a region where taxis
service had become all but dysfunctional. The ease with which UberX had recruited
drivers and immediately placed them on the street transporting passengers has been
phenomenal and well documented. The lack of traditional car-for-hire regulatory
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restrictions has made UberX more accessible to both drivers and riders with its ease of
driver enrollment and simplicity of passengers using smartphones to summon a ride.
Unlike Uber Black, the smartphone application that summons a black luxury car at
premium cost, UberX meets the more precise definition of DRS which is the short notice
matching of riders and drivers in average, privately owned vehicles. Hence, Kalanick's
UberX model offered more potential to disrupt the taxi industry with its simplified model
(Brustein, 2013).
2.2.2 Lyft
In 2007, Logan Green, a recent University of California, Santa Barbara graduate,
developed a web-based DRS service called Zimride.com to make trips to see friends in
California (Bell, 2007). The use of websites on the Internet to match riders with drivers
was not new in 2007, dating back as far back as the 1990s (Dailey, Loseff, & Meyers,
1999). A fundamental change came when Facebook released its application
programming interface (API) to third-party developers. Green used this opportunity to
incorporate the trust and reputation capabilities of Facebook that would make ridematching closer to present-day DRS (Masabumi, et al. 2013). Leveraging the social
networking capabilities of the website Facebook added two elements that were missing
from ride-matching: overcoming the initial fear of getting into a vehicle with a total
stranger and creating the critical mass of users necessary to provide regular and complete
round-trip service (Bell, 2007).
Later in 2007, Green met John Zimmer, an analyst at Lehman Brothers in New
York. Zimmer’s graduate studies at Cornell University included transportation issues
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with a particular emphasis on solving the problem of underutilized road capacity,
estimated to be about 80% daily. Zimmer saw this as an opportunity to fill those empty
seats and make efficient use of road capacity. By the time of Lyft’s launch in San
Francisco during the summer of 2012, about 2000 seats per month were being filled on
rides between San Francisco and Los Angeles for about $35.00 each way (Gustin, 2012).
As CEO for Lyft, Zimmer has been instrumental in developing the platform’s core
philosophies. These beliefs included using enabling technology to change structural
inefficiencies in transportation (Gustin, 2012) and focus on community-building to bring
people together (Olanoff, 2012).
2.2.3 SideCar
SideCar, a DRS platform launched in San Francisco in June 2012, is third ranked
among the national platforms operating today. Initially, SideCar differentiated itself in
how it priced rides. SideCar began an innovative policy where the passenger set the price
of the ride, which the company called donations, rather than fares. Instead of choosing a
set price, the app asks the passenger to decide how much he/she feels the ride is worth.
(Brustein, 2013). The passenger's price was honored as a valid fare regardless of whether
it covered the cost of the driver's time and/or vehicle operation. The "donation" policy
changed in 2013 and riders were required to pay minimum fares. This decision was made
to compete with Uber and Lyft and encourage SideCar drivers to drive more regularly
(Rodriguez, 2013). Like the two larger platforms, SideCar incorporates trust and
reputation systems that allow drivers and riders to rate each other. Trust and reputation
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systems are an integral part of the sharing economy and in the case of DRS have a direct
role in the operation of app-enabled ridesharing programs (Miller, 2013).
2.3 Existential Issues Facing the DRS Platforms
2.3.1 Insurance and DRS Platforms
Automobile insurance is handled similarly by each DRS service and is often a
function of the state in which the platform operates. Platforms claim their insurance
packages cover occupants of vehicles and injuries to persons and property outside of
vehicles in the event of an accident during the entire DRS process. Platform-paid
coverage generally begins from the moment the app is opened until it is shut off.
Specifics depend on the platform, the jurisdiction being served, and any DRS-specific
regulation that has been put in place at the state or municipal level. For example, Lyft
states in its insurance overview that a driver has contingent liability insurance while
his/her smartphone app is on waiting for a ride match. During the time defined by the
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) as Period 1, up to $50,000 coverage per
person is offered for bodily injury, up to $100,000 per accident for bodily injury, and up
to $25,000 per accident for property damage. In addition, Lyft offers excess liability and
uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage up to $1,000,000 per occurrence and
contingent collision and comprehensive coverage of up to $50,000 per accident with a
deductible of $2,500 (Lyft, 2014). UberX offers coverage in most states at levels similar
to taxis and limousines in the cities of those states (Uber Blog, 2014). Sidecar's driver
liability for property damage and/or bodily injuries to passengers or third parties offers
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coverage at $1,000,000 per occurrence and is similar to Lyft and UberX, however,
additional coverage for the "app on" period is only offered for the state of Washington.
The model of regulation that has been emulated by most DRS platforms is based
on a decision made by the CPUC in San Francisco on September 2013 where the name
Transportation Network Company (TNC) was created to define DRS platforms that used
smartphones and Internet technology to match riders with drivers (California Public
Utilities Commission, 2013) (Appendix B). The CPUC also set mandatory rules on
driver and criminal background searches for drivers registering with a TNC. Insurance
was also made necessary by the CPUC, setting three "defined periods" to help clarify
when insurance applies. Period One is "App open-waiting for match"; the driver is in
his/her vehicle and turns on the app. Period Two is "Match is accepted- but the
passenger is not yet picked up"; the driver is on his/her way to retrieve the passenger.
Period Three is "Passenger in the vehicle and until the passenger safely exits vehicle"
(Table 2.1). The CPUC wanted to make sure there were no insurance gaps when drivers
were getting paid to give rides and achieved this with the legislation passed (G.
Mathieux, personal communication, October 9, 2014).
Table 2.1: CPUC defined periods when TNC covers insurance.
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Controversy still exists over TNCs and their role at airports. Despite a near
universal laissez-faire acceptance of TNCs throughout California's cities and the rest of
the United States, airports have stood vehemently opposed to TNC operations on airport
property. Their hesitancy ostensibly stems from a concern about additional traffic
congestion at airports. Some TNCs, such as Wingz, circumvent the airport issue since
they do not use a smartphone app, but instead accept reservations for airport pickups and
drop offs through their website only. The CPUC and the City of San Francisco recognize
that web-based companies such as Wingz historically had customers reserve rides via the
web. Thus, they are exempt from the Period One and Period Two phases of insurance
coverage. The "hybrid" web-based TNCs are required to provide coverage for defined
Period Three. Defined period three is when the passenger enters the vehicle and until
he/she safely exits (G. Mathieux, personal communication, October 6, 2014). Discussions
to allow TNCs at airports are ongoing.
2.3.2 TNCs and the Taxi and Limousine Industry
Another major issue affecting the viability of modern DRS platforms, including
those operating as TNCs, is their mixed and often contentious reception by municipalities
and the taxi and limousine industry. When TNCs such as Uber, Lyft, and SideCar enter a
market, municipalities find themselves in an awkward position of intermediary between
the interests of influential labor and taxi industry lobbies and local citizens who see DRS
as an environmentally progressive and cost effective alternative to the old taxi and
limousine model. In most cases, the local taxi industry and its attendant labor groups
resist the DRS platforms citing unfair advantage due to the lack of regulation. Some
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municipalities have raised the issue to the state level requiring a degree of regulation
from the DRS platforms by classifying them as TNCs. TNC regulation typically includes
mandatory motor vehicle and criminal background checks on drivers, safety inspections
of vehicles, and minimal commercial insurance coverage.
DRS platforms operate in more than 90 cities in the United States. Only seven
states, Delaware, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, West Virginia, and
Wyoming have not had a DRS platform enter any of their municipalities as of 2014.
Noticeably absent from the list of DRS cities is Las Vegas, NV, a city whose taxi and
limousine industry is unique. Taxi regulation in Las Vegas is by a state-appointed board
of officials shielded from direct lobbying by the major TNCs (Shine, 2014). Las Vegas
with its giant tourist industry, however, cannot be ignored, and how and if the TNCs
manage a launch in this city can be another indication of how viable DRS is especially in
cities that have strong political mechanisms in place to thwart acceptance .
The question of DRS's viability, however, seems close to being answered
affirmatively as unlike Las Vegas, most municipalities have only been able to issue
cease and desist orders to TNCs. Cease and desist orders are ignored summarily by the
TNCs, who would rather pay fines than halt operations. Another tactic used to halt or
slow down TNC market entrance is quick and temporary legislation that is contingent on
a final vote off in the future. This approach often fails as well since in the interim TNCs
have time to take their case to the public who is typically sympathetic. Hence, acceptance
continues to evolve with all but eighteen states having some form of legislation pending
(Jergler, 2014).
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When a DRS platform enters a new market, it follows an established pattern based
on its inception in San Francisco. At first there is intense interest by early adopters and
the unemployed/underemployed who see a promising new transport mode and help to
diffuse the innovation rapidly. The reaction of taxi and limousine companies to early
DRS launches were initially benign. The newcomers were sometimes cast in the local
press as outgrowths of the Great Recession of the late 2000s and its concomitant Sharing
Economy (Fournier, et al., 2013). The DRS platforms' close association with technology
was initially seen as a fad associated with young urban adults. With time and experience,
however, taxi and limousine companies quickly learned that DRS platforms were well
received by drivers and riders across the demographic spectrum. Current reaction to DRS
arrival is now quite proactive usually beginning with press campaigns and appeals at the
municipal level to reign in the unregulated competitors. Unfortunately, once the local
citizens experience DRS it becomes difficult to reverse. The reason for this is the DRS
platforms have been savvy in their use of promotions and media in inculcate themselves
into the local culture. Also, allowing them to demonstrate their service has filled a void in
many cities where clean, reliable, and pleasant taxi service has been missing.
Municipalities try to reach consensus among the DRS platforms and its
constituency made up of primary stakeholders such as local citizens, labor unions, and
taxi and limousine companies. Additionally, depending on the municipality, taxi
medallion owners are a vocal group who stand to lose significant income. Taxi
medallions are government-controlled taxi permits that increase in value based on
economic regulation such as limited supply for the entire city. The provision and value of
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medallions become meaningless as the rate of DRS adoption increases (Badger, 2014).
The concerns of medallion owners have yet to be resolved and promises to be a sticky
future issue as it involves government taking or eminent domain arguments and possible
compensation for the owners (PR Newswire, 2014). Further research into the status of
medallions with regards to TNCs is required in order to find optimal solutions for this
problem.
Cities in the United States began regulating taxi companies in the 1920s in order
to deal with the chaos of independent drivers, upgrading of safety standards, and
reduction of discriminatory practices (Dempsey, 1996). Part of that regulation was the
institution of the medallion system. About fifty years later many taxi companies were
deregulated along with other transport modes as per the business and ideological moods
of that time. As will be shown in the case history of San Francisco, deregulation brought
unsatisfactory results to most cities causing them to resume regulation or seek piecemeal
fixes through ballot initiatives.
2.4 Case Study: Dynamic Ridesharing in San Francisco
San Francisco is often the starting point for a contemporary technology story (e.g.
Apple, Hewlett Packard, Xerox, eBay, etc). Hence, it would seem logical to credit the site
and situation characteristics of the San Francisco Bay Area with the origination and
growth of DRS since it is one of the world’s preeminent research and development
centers. Its proximity to major research universities and the technopole of Silicon Valley
is credited with the origination of many elements of DRS technology. However, it will be
shown that fundamental urban transportation issues lying outside San Francisco’s role as
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technopole were in place several decades earlier (Castells, Hall, 1994). Dysfunctional
management of the region’s taxi industry forced innovation onto this, the first of the DRS
cities. An environment for reform within the taxi industry was already in place before
DRS arrived in the Bay Area. And when it did arrive its success was notable. San
Franciscans tend to be early innovation adopters, and their adoption of DRS was no
exception as it filled a need for service in a city notable for its poor deployment of taxis.
To understand the origination of ICT-enabled DRS in the Bay area, reflection on the last
35 years of attempted reform of the taxi industry in San Francisco will be instructive.
2.4.1 Background
In 1978, perceptions of unfairness and corruption within the taxi industry of San
Francisco led to ballot initiative Proposition K (Newsham, 2000). Proposition K called
for a system using taxi medallions as operating permits, to be issued by the City of San
Francisco to persons paying an annual fee (San Francisco Municipal Transportation
Agency, 2014). Persons possessing medallions are not a driver, but rather owners of
medallions, who lease it to experienced taxi drivers in order to generate income. Under
Proposition K, the city placed a limit on the number of medallions it authorized. By 2009,
the next year of significant regulatory reform, the limit on the number of medallions
authorized was 1,500 for a city of more than 800,000 people. The 1,500 medallion-limit
represented a gradual increase over several decades intended to keep pace with demand.
Suppressing the medallion limit, however, proved to be one of the contributing factors in
public complaints regarding the difficulty of ordering a taxi (Said, 2014).
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The 1978 system was designed to prevent speculators from bidding up the price
of permits by awarding medallions only to individuals who would rent taxis from
established companies at a set fee per shift. However, after several decades it was
apparent that this system was not optimal for deployment of taxis throughout the city
(Newsham, 2000). An attempt to reform Proposition K led to a successful 2007 vote on
Proposition A giving the San Francisco Board of Supervisors the option of transferring
regulatory jurisdiction from the Taxi Commission to the San Francisco Municipal
Transportation Agency (SFMTA) (San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency,
2014). In March, 2009, the Board of Supervisors exercised the option, and the SFMTA
added the Taxi Commission to a consolidation with the San Francisco Municipal Railway
and the Department of Parking and Traffic. Proposition A's significance to the taxi
industry was that by placing the Taxi Commission under the auspices of the SFMTA,
reforming Proposition K could be realized. The transfer of jurisdiction to the SFMTA
also brought retirement and medical benefits to career taxi drivers. In the past, low
incomes and meager benefits precluded a social safety net despite the many years of
service per average driver (Lam, et al., 2006).
Since 1978 taxi drivers have been operating as independent contractors of the
established taxi companies, e.g. Yellow Cab. Independent contractor status had worked
to the benefit of the taxi companies that were insured income from the leasing of
medallion-linked vehicles to drivers regardless of how often they were used during a
shift. Companies also benefitted from the independent contractor relationship with
drivers having been relieved of paying disability and social security taxes as well as being
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shielded from the threat of unionization (Newsham, 2000). Many drivers approved of the
independent contractor status seeing it as a benefit freeing them from direct supervision
and granting the ability to set one's work schedule (Newsham, 2000).
Unfortunately, passengers suffered most from this system. Upon examination of
the 1978 and 2007 rules and regulation, passengers in San Francisco are never guaranteed
service when they request a taxi. The entire system is skewed to the medallion and taxi
company owners who earn set fees from drivers regardless of the hours and amount of
passengers handled in a work shift. For example, when a request for a ride is transmitted
to a particular taxi it is broadcast to all available drivers of that company, regardless of
distance or whether their vehicle is occupied with a passenger. One hopes the request will
be heard by drivers who are roaming and waiting for passengers. Ironically, this is the
primary dysfunction of the system because drivers are operating independently and are
under no obligation to accept a call for a ride. An available driver close by to the potential
rider might be ending his/her shift and will opt to leave the request open where it may or
may not be accepted by drivers who are farther away.
Thus, passengers in San Francisco had been deprived of reliable taxi service for
many decades despite attempted ballot initiatives that were really aimed at reforms
designed to favor medallion and taxi company owners. Hence, the San Francisco taxi
problem sets the stage for the DRS innovators who understood the problem and applied
the enabling technologies that would fill a void and bring reliable taxi service to
passengers.
2.4.2 The Launch and Operation of Dynamic Ridesharing in San Francisco
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ICT-enabled DRS was launched first in San Francisco, a city in need of taxi
reform and possessing the requisite engineering and financial talent requiring a successful
operation. Both major DRS providers, Uber and Lyft, launched service in San Francisco
at approximately the same time. Concurrent with the launches of Uber and an Lyft, San
Francisco voters debated and eventually passed Proposition A, the law that would give
the taxi industry yet another chance at reform. Ironically, as Proposition A was being
voted into law a nascent DRS industry was beginning with a positive public reception.
Other DRS services entered the San Francisco market encouraged by the success of Uber,
Lyft, and SideCar.
In the wake of the successful 2013 CPUC ruling in San Francisco, incidents have
occurred which continue to test TNCs. For example, a few months after the CPUC made
carrying insurance mandatory for each DRS, a six-year-old girl was struck and killed at a
San Francisco intersection by an UberX driver on the evening of December 31, 2013
(Melendez, 2014). The UberX driver had been picking up and dropping off passengers
that evening using the UberX app on his smartphone. Under the CPUC ruling Uber must
cover both the driver and his passengers with $1 million liability insurance, however,
Uber contends that coverage is only in effect while drivers are transporting riders with the
app on (Table 2.1). According to Uber, when the pedestrian was struck, the driver did not
have a passenger in his car and was not on his way to pick up passengers, thus he was not
providing services to Uber at the time of the accident (Melendez, 2013). The case is still
pending with both Uber and the driver fighting a wrongful death lawsuit filed against
each of them (Williams & Alexander, 2014). The victim's lawyer stated that if a device
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such as a smartphone is turned on waiting for ride requests, in essence the driver is
providing TNC service. Uber contends that although the device was turned on, it was
only displaying a GPS map, and not information on potential rides.
The case of the six-year-old accident victim is being watched carefully as there is
hope it will answer questions to some of the vagaries regarding insurance and TNCs. The
CPUC ruling in 2013 states that the TNC coverers drivers who use their app to engage in
sharing for up to $1 to $1.5 million in liability insurance once the passenger is in the car.
The accident involving the child raises the question of whose insurance covers an
accident. If it is not Uber's insurance providing coverage then is it the driver's personal
insurance since he/she was not transporting passengers. At present, insurers offering
personal automobile insurance view any conveyance for pay as a commercial use which
would void a drivers insurance. Insurance providers are becoming increasingly aware of
the proliferation of DRS platforms and warn that they will not honor policies of drivers
using DRS apps (Property Casualty Insurers Association of America, 2014).
2.5 Conclusions
DRS is evolving quickly, and it is still too early to understand the impact of its
disruption to the car-for-hire industry, transportation in general, and the physical
environment. As a transportation demand management strategy, DRS promises to fill the
unused seats in SOVs and by doing so increase lane capacity and level of service
(Levosky & Greenberg, 2001). Its evolution from Internet to smartphone-based
applications has been instrumental in its current successful proliferation throughout the
United States and cities globally. Two fundamental issues, however, threaten DRS in its
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current smartphone-based iteration. Although much has already been worked out
between the TNCs and insurance providers regarding the insurance gap, the time when a
driver has his/her app on and is waiting for a ride match, questions still remain and are
being addressed state-by-state. Apart from insurance, the other issue threatening DRS is
its coexistence with local taxi and limousine companies. On this issue, stakeholders are
divided three ways, with municipalities playing a mediator role attempting to bring
consensus to all parties (Anderson, 2014).
If left unanswered, questions on insurance will discourage participants,
particularly drivers who will expose themselves to legal and financial tribulations. As of
2014, TNC drivers have sufficient coverage, according to the DRS platforms discussed in
this study. Drivers are still expected to carry personal automobile insurance which is
supposed to cover all situations, including when they are driving for a TNC with their app
off (Table 2.1). Unfortunately, personal insurers cancel their policies when they discover
that the driver has been using the vehicle as an independent contractor for a TNC. The
solution insurers and TNCs are currently working toward is affordable commercial
insurance for casual DRS drivers with details yet to be determined (Property Casualty
Insurers Association of America, 2014).
The adversarial relationship between the DRS platforms and the taxi and
limousine industry threatens the continued evolution of platforms into regulated TNCs
capable of providing inexpensive and reliable service. If the taxi industry prevails in
restricting the number of vehicles a TNC is allowed to operate in each municipality, DRS
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will be nothing more than an alternative mode of transportation. The promise of reducing
urban traffic and the subsequent environmental benefits that go with it will be
diminished. The owners of taxi companies and medallions stand much to lose, and it is in
their interest to prevent an all out disruption of their industry.
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CHAPTER 3

The users of real-time dynamic ridesharing: Who are they?

Abstract

This study examines the current demographic characteristics and usage of
dynamic ridesharing (DRS). The approach to this empirical research was quantitative
based on a structured web-survey administered to a targeted audience of 306 DRS users.
It was informative to learn the similarities and differences among the respondents to
determine the value of implementing DRS as an alternative transportation mode.
Descriptive statistics were used to explore DRS users' motivations that will ultimately
provide opportunities for service improvements and expansion.
Internet- technology-enabled DRS is an emerging disruptive innovation of the
transportation industry. DRS is being adopted rapidly by consumers, however little was
known about the nature and level of activity of early adopters. Through an examination
of a sample of the U.S. population who has adopted DRS, we had hoped to understand
how the new technology is providing alternatives to single-occupant vehicle (SOV) use.
The study provided a portrait of DRS users in urban areas nationally and explained how
they are using this mode of transportation.
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3. Introduction
In the past several years there has been a proliferation of web- and mobile appbased platforms offering drivers and passengers convenient matching using Internet and
communication technologies (ICT) that are location-aware and operate in real-time
(Agatz, et. al, 2012). The objective of this study was to examine the current state and
directions of real-time ridesharing by learning the demographic characteristics of users
via an Internet survey. Real-time ridesharing services such as Uber, Lyft, and SideCar are
sometimes called Transportation Network Companies (TNCs) by municipal and state
jurisdictions. TNC status distinguishes these services from traditionally regulated taxis
and limousines, e.g., medallion-issued for-hire vehicles that are regulated, especially by
the amount of vehicles that are permitted to operate in any one city on a regular basis.
TNCs provide point-to-point transportation through app-based platforms on the web and
commonly accessed through mobile devices. These services are referred to as Dynamic
Ridesharing (DRS) within this study. Regarding the taxonomy of DRS's name, there is
contention among transportation professionals and academics as to what should be the
proper name of this service. Other names commonly used include e-hailing, on-demand
ridesharing, and instant ridesharing. Most academics familiar with the DRS transport
mode agree that it is primarily ridesharing for-hire assisted by Internet-enabled, locationaware mobile communications technology, and augmented with social media such as
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Facebook and Twitter (Siddiqi & Buliung, 2013). Despite this agreement, variations on
the name persist in the literature.
Examination of the user characteristics was accomplished via a 30 question
survey administered to 306 DRS users over the Internet by SurveyMonkey, an Internet
platform that provides consumer audiences. The author believed that a broad
understanding of the users of DRS might lend insight into this mode of transportation that
has the potential to fill the empty seats of single-occupant vehicles (SOVs). Despite
push-back from the taxi and limousine industry who view DRS as a serious business
disruption, DRS has been gaining popularity with consumers as a fast and convenient
method of transport around busy urban areas. DRS is fast becoming the preferred method
of securing point-to-point transportation, especially in cities (Rayle, et. al, 2014).
Up until this point, assumptions have been made regarding who are the users of
DRS. Many application designers have relied on anecdotal information that assumes
users are primarily young, affluent, city dwellers who would normally use traditional taxi
and limousine service, but are instead opting for smartphone-based platforms for pointto-point rides (Nelson, 2015) . Such assumptions exclude deeper exploration of the full
demographics, thus precluding DRS-designed systems for suburban and semi-rural areas
where automobile use, especially SOVs, is dominant. Although some of the DRS
platforms have created proprietary data that aims advertising at their primary users, there
are fewer public studies examining the users of DRS (Rayle, et. al, 2014).
3.1 What is DRS?
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DRS is a variant of ridesharing and carpooling that makes use of ICT to match
rides between drivers and passengers in real-time (Agatz, et. al, 2012). The primary
advancement allowing DRS to move forward from its early web-based beginnings is the
Internet-enabled and location-aware mobile phone, also called a "smartphone", that uses
an operating system (OS) much like a desktop computer. In conjunction with the
smartphone, social media has played a role in the successful operation of DRS. Social
media websites such as Facebook and Twitter have allowed real-time conversations
between users. Social media has also lent facility to trust and reputation systems that
have removed much of the trepidation inherent in getting into a car with a strange driver.
Trust and reputation systems also allow passengers to rate driver behavior and vice versa.
Smartphones also contain the enabling technology that allows drivers and passengers to
communicate and locate each other in real-time using built-in Global Positioning System
(GPS) navigation systems.
Mass adoption of the smartphone began in 2007 with the introduction of the
iPhone by Apple, Inc., and has since been expanded by a proliferation of applications that
have made DRS accessible and convenient to those seeking to provide or receive pointto-point transportation on demand. In 2008 other smartphones using similar technology
were introduced, e.g., Android, an open-source operating system introduced by Google,
Inc., making DRS-use widespread in not only the U.S. but also globally. With
smartphone ownership reaching 65% of U.S. cellular consumers (Nielsen, 2014), an
understanding of the demographic profile of DRS users can offer information on possible
changing attitudes towards the relationship between consumers and their transportation
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choices. It is important to understand transportation preference since any changes in the
sector will have a significant impact on the physical environment. The most recent
estimate of transportation's share of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions is 32.9%; currently
the largest among the energy consuming sectors (Davis, Diegel, & Boundy, 2014, p. 1115).
3.2 Methodology and Instrument
User data demographic and activity was gathered through a 30–item questionnaire
capturing reactions to existing DRS systems and rating DRS services. The survey was
based on closed-end and Likert scale questions that explored users' demographic profiles
as well as their attitudes towards DRS, and related concepts such as trust and reputation
systems, automobile cost, and ownership. The survey was randomly administered to 306
respondents online by SurveyMonkey, an Internet platform that collects responses from
an audience it provides for a set fee (Figure 3.1). The respondents were selected from
SurveyMonkey's in-house audience members who were asked the qualifying question,
"Have you in the past 30 days used dynamic ridesharing (Uber, Lyft, etc.)?" Audience
members did not receive compensation for their participation other than a small monetary
contribution on their behalf through SurveyMonkey to charities of their choice
(SurveyMonkey, 2015) (APPENDIX A & B)
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Figure 3.1: A sample of survey instrument questions and scales.
3.2.1 Demographic characteristics of DRS users
Table 3.1 illustrates the demographic characteristics of DRS users. One hundred
percent of the total sample was from the U.S. Gender was split at 50.65% (155) male, and
49.35% (151) females. The race of respondents was predominately white at 88.00%
(271). The disproportionate percentage of white users corresponds with the general
demographic profile of U.S. taxi passengers and DRS drivers who, in general, tend to be
overwhelmingly white. Relationship status indicates married 45.78% (141), and single,
never married 33.77% (104) were the majority of all respondents. Most respondents came
from the Pacific region with 28.53% (214) of responses. The high representation of the
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Pacific region corresponds to the location's role as the origin of DRS, with San Francisco
and Seattle populations as two of the earliest cities to adopt the service. Educational
attainment was high with the majority of respondents reporting college graduation
41.50% (127) and a high number completing graduate school at 30.39% (93).
Respondents tended to be not only college graduates, but also holders of higher degrees.
There was a substantial number of respondents reporting income above $200,000 at
23.86% (73). It is possible this reflects the Pacific regions reporting dominance where
incomes tend to be higher than in the rest of the nation. Table 3.1 also indicates
Table 3.1: Summary of respondents' demographic profile
Demographic
Gender
Age

Relationship status

U.S. Region (note: See map)

Educational attainment

Income

Ethnicity
Employment

Results
Male 50.65 % (155); Female 49.35% (151)
18-24 17.21% (53); 25 to 34 30.19% (93); 35-44
15.26% (47); 45-54 17.86% (55); 55 to 64 12.99%
(40); 65 or older 6.49% (20)
Married 45.78% (141); Widowed 0.97% (3),
Divorced 2.60%( 8); Separated 0.65% (2); Domestic
partnership or civil union 1.62% (5); Single, but
cohabitating with a significant other 14.61% (45);
and Single, never married 33.77% (104)
New England 8.00% (60); Middle Atlantic 13.47%
(101); East North Central 11.47% (86); West North
Central 5.60% (42); South Atlantic 17.07% (128);
East South Central 2.80% (21); West South Central
6.93% (52); Mountain 6.13% (46); Pacific 28.53%
(214)
High school graduate 1.30% (4); Some college
16.56% (51); College graduate 41.23% (127); Some
graduate school 10.06% (31); Completed graduate
school 30.19% (93)
$0-$24,999 7.19% (22); $25,000-$49,000 11.44%
(35); $50,000-$74,000 16.34% (50); $75,000$99,000 10.31% (31); $100,000-$124,000 11.11%
(34); $125,000-$149,000 7.19% (22); $150,000$174,000 7.52% (7); $175,000-$199,000 5.23% (8);
$200,000 and up 23.86% (73)
White 87.99% (271); African-American 0.97% (3);
Asian 4.55% (14); Multiple races 6.49% (20)
Employed, full-time 74.35% (229); Employed, part
time 7.79% (24); Not employed, looking for work
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Currently enrolled as a student

Housing tenure
Vehicles available per household
Principal Industry of Employment

3.57% (11); Not employed, not looking for work
4.87%; (15) Retired 8.12% (25); Disabled, not able
to work 1.30% (4)
Yes, full time in graduate school 4.22% (13); Yes,
part time in graduate school 3.90% (12); Yes, full
time in four year undergraduate 6.17% (19); Yes,
part time in four year undergraduate 0.65% (2); Yes,
full time in two year undergraduate 0.65% (2); Yes,
part time in two year undergraduate 0.32% (1); Yes,
at a high school or equivalent 0.00% (0); Not
currently enrolled as a student 84.09% (259)
Rent 49.03% (151); Own 48.38% (149); Other
2.60% (8)
0- 7.21% (53); 1- 29.22% (90); 2- 36.36%(112); 310.71% (33); 4- 4.87% (15); 5+ 1.62% (5)
Advertising & Marketing 4.56% (14); Education
9.77% (30); Finance & Financial Services 7.17%
(22) Healthcare & Pharmaceuticals 9.12% (28);
Nonprofit 7.82% (24); Telecommunications,
Technology, Internet & Electronics 12.70% (39);
Currently not Employed 8.14% (25); Other 14.66%
(45)

that the majority of respondents were employed full time at 74.35% (229). Housing
tenure for respondents was even with 49.03% (151) reporting they rent, and 48.38%
(149) reporting ownership. Table 3.1 indicates that the majority of respondents, 36.6%
(112), had two vehicles available to their household. Only 17.21% (53) had zero vehicles
available. Respondents were asked if they were currently enrolled as students, and an
overwhelming majority answered no to this question at 84.09% (259). Thus, the survey
data can support that DRS is not a phenomenon just among college students. Finally,
respondents reported a diverse mix of industries that employed them. The largest
employment representatives were education at 9.77% (30), healthcare and
pharmaceuticals at 9.12% (28), Telecommunications, Internet, and electronics at 12.70%
(39), currently not employed at 8.14% (25), and a large group who answered "other" at
14.66% (45). Those who answered "other" to the Principal Industry of Employment
question tended to duplicate categories that were presented in the survey, e.g. technology
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and engineering for "Telecommunications, Technology, Internet & Electronics", and
retired and disabled for "I am currently not employed".
3.3 Demographic Comparisons
Demographic data was collected for each respondent. The demographic data
allowed us to analyze differences between subgroups (e.g. age, gender, educational
attainment, income, etc.) and aspects of DRS such as selection of platform (e.g. UberX,
Lyft, SideCar, etc.), frequency of use, access to amenities, replacements of other modes
(e.g. personal car, bus, subway, etc.), and vehicle maintenance cost among other
characteristics of DRS.
3.3.1 Demographic comparison based on gender
Question 21, "What is your Gender?" explored how male and female users
perceived DRS, either differently or equally. The survey results were balanced between
males and female users: Male 50.7% (155), Female 48.7% (149) (Table 3.1). Preference
of DRS platform, Question 4, did not indicate any significant difference in choice among
males or females, however, it did confirm the dominance of Uber Black/UberX, Lyft, and
SideCar as the most preferred platforms among either gender (Table 3.2).
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Table 3.2: Question 4. Which of the DRS applications on your smartphone have you
used? Please check all that apply.
DRS Platform
Uber Black
UberX
Lyft
SideCar
Hitch-a-Ride
Car.ma
Summon
Wingz
Other
N = 306

Percent
36.73%
83.33%
28.09%
3.40%
1.23%
1.23%
1.23%
0.93%
2.78%

Frequency
(119)
(270)
(91)
(11)
(4)
(4)
(4)
(3)
(9)

Question 7, " Which mode of transportation are you most often replacing when
you use dynamic ridesharing?" did reveal differences between the genders in how they
substituted other modes for DRS. For example, both males and females selected
"Personal car" and "Taxi" as the two transportation modes most often replaced by DRS in
73% (222) of the cases. In the "Personal car" category, females were found more often
than males to replace their personal vehicles: male 37.42% (58), female 47.02% (71).
The response may reflect the economic reality of less access to automobile ownership
due to lower incomes realized by adult female workers. Conversely, males in the survey
tended more than females to replace taxis with DRS: male 37.42% (58), female 23.84%
(36). Higher taxi use and its concomitant substitution with DRS might indicate the
higher spending power of male users who have more access than females to premium ondemand transportation. The result in the difference among taxi replacement indicates that
there is evidence of a relationship between gender and taxi replacement (Chi-square =
14.866, df 8, p = 0.05).
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Supporting taxi replacement, Question 6 asked, "People use dynamic ridesharing
to access various services and amenities. Please tell us where you have traveled to using a
dynamic ridesharing service?" indicates fairly even use among males and females except
in the category "Work". When choosing a destination using DRS, males traveled
significantly more to work than females: male 45.81% (71), female 30.46% (46).
Question 9 explored a fundamental aspect of DRS: the improved mobility with its
ability to fill empty vehicle seats. The implication for this is freer flowing roads that
utilize lane capacity more efficiently. Further benefits to the environment are realized
with more passengers traveling in fewer vehicles. Thus, when asked "When using
dynamic ridesharing as a passenger, on average how many people, including yourself,
were passengers in the vehicle?" respondents were being asked to help reveal whether
DRS works as a transportation demand management (TDM) strategy by reducing single
occupancy vehicles (SOV), or if it was simply a variation of taxis and limousines cruising
city streets for hours with a single driver picking up one passenger on average (Figure
3.2). Question 9 offered for answer choices: one, two, three more, or not applicable due
to the respondent's role as primarily a driver, in which case the respondent had a choice
of opting out of the question. All in responses in Question 9 assume the exclusion of the
driver, e.g. an answer of 2 means two passengers and not one driver and one passenger.
There is fairly even distribution among males and females except in category "three or
more" where females answered significantly higher than males: male 10.97% (17),
female 23.18% (35). What is interesting about this result from a DRS standpoint is that
reluctance to enter a car with a stranger was often a hindrance to DRS until the
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introduction of mandatory driving record and criminal background checks for drivers.
This result could be evidence that such security checks are convincing among female
respondents. Statistical significance indicates strong evidence of a relationship between
gender and number of passengers per vehicle (Chi-Square = 8.615, df = 3, p < 0.05)
(Figure 3.2). This relationship is further substantiated in Question 11, "I am less
concerned about safety and security knowing the driver has had a criminal background
check and is covered with sufficient liability insurance in the event of an accident.",
where female respondents answered much higher than males on the scale stating
"Strongly agree": male 29.68% (46), female 45.04% (68).

Figure 3.2: Gender compared with Question 9: "When using dynamic ridesharing as a
passenger, how many people, including yourself, were passengers in the vehicle?"
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In Question 15, "To what extent is not owning a car a significant factor in
choosing dynamic ridesharing?" females answered with a higher response rate of a
combined 33.77% (51) for answer choices "Most significant" and "Significant". Males
answered significantly lower at 13.55% (21) for "Most significant" and "Significant".
There is very strong evidence of a relationship between gender and choosing DRS due to
lack of owning a car (Chi-Square = 17.588. df = 5, p < 0.05).
Question 16 explored users' attitudes towards DRS as an alternative transportation
strategy to reduce the automotive impact on the physical environment. The Likert scale
question of one to five measuring from "Very important" to "Not important" with regards
to the respondent's choice being made based on environmental considerations. For this
question, males answered significantly lower stating that the environment was not
important in choosing DRS: male 41.94% (65), female 22.53% (34). There is statistical
evidence of a relationship between gender and choosing DRS for concern regarding the
physical environment (Chi-Square = 14.511, df = 4, p < 0.05).
There were similar answers for both genders in Question 19 which asked, "To
what extent is using dynamic ridesharing a better option than using public
transportation?" Both genders answered affirmatively that DRS was a better option than
public transportation. The Likert question again had a scale of one to five ranging from
"Better" to "Not better". Within the first three categories of the scale, males answered
affirmatively 89.04% (138), and females 94.04% (142). The result taken from a sample
from each region of the nation could indicate an overall failure of public transportation
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nationally. Further research is needed to confirm whether this is localized to a specific
region(s) or a national issue.
However, when asked in Question 20, "Would you consider moving to a larger
home in an area with limited or no public transportation if dynamic ridesharing was a
reliable option?" the answer was generally negative. Males answered the question scale
with a response of "Moderately consider, 25.16% (39), and females 32.45% (49). The
"Not considered" category was the highest with males answering 38.06% (59), and
females 25.83% (39). Hence, DRS appears to be appreciated more by urban users who
see it as a substitute for public transportation. Suburban, or potential suburban users, do
not see DRS as a transportation system that fits in less populated areas. This is
significant as the majority of automobile activity is in less densely populated areas and
could benefit from an adaptation of DRS to a suburban setting (Badger, 2015).
In summary, there is little difference in the way males and females use DRS.
However, there appears to be statistical significance in some areas to indicate differences
based on gender. The results indicate that for males, it appears that DRS is used as a
replacement for taxis and limousines, or in situations where a for-hire vehicle (FHV) is
appropriate, i.e. business travel, event travel, etc. Also, males are less concerned with the
criminal background check and screening of drivers and less concerned with the
environmentally positive aspects of DRS. Female users are most often replacing a
personal car or bus with DRS. As indicated in Question 15, females answered
significantly higher than males regarding a lack of car ownership as a factor in choosing
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DRS. This could be indicative of socioeconomic factors that constrain car ownership for
female DRS users.
3.3.2 Demographic comparison based on age
When respondents were asked about their age in question 22, they responded as
in Table 3.3. Nearly 50% (47.06%) of respondents were in the first two categories
representing 18 to 34-year-olds. As a single cohort, the majority of the young DRS users
were in the 25 to 34 group representing almost one-third of all respondents: 30.07% (92).
The two youngest groups represents the so-called Millennial Generation, a name
attributed to the demographic cohort representing people born approximately between
1980 and 2000 (Strauss & Howe, 2000). Thus, the survey revealed that millennials were
nearly half of all DRS, a statistic in line with other studies that show this group trending
away from car ownership and becoming more deeply invested in social media and its
attendant technologies such as smartphones and tablets (Nelson, 2015).
Table 3.3: Question 21. What is your age?
Age group
18 to 24
25 to 34
35 to 44
45 to 54
55 to 64
65 or older
Total
N= 306

Percent
16.99%
30.07%
15.36%
17.97%
13.07%
6.54%
100.00%

Frequency
52
92
47
55
40
20
306

When asked about which mode of transportation was being replaced with DRS,
the 18 to 24 and 25 to 34 cohorts answered that they were mostly replacing their personal
car (30.19% and 38.71% respectively) and taxi (20.75% and 33.33% respectively). An
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anomaly was observed, however, among the 18 to 24 cohort who reported replacing
"walking" with DRS at 18.87% (10). This high score was significantly more than the next
highest group, 45 to 54, who reported 3.64% (2) replacing walking with DRS. The
explanation for this high score could be attributed to the group's lower income potential
and its implication for lower car ownership and taxi use. Respondents of the next three
cohorts, 35 to 44, 45 to 54, and 55 to 64, reported replacing a personal car and taxi more
often than other modes, however, percentages for personal car were higher than the
younger cohorts: 57.45% (27), 50.91% (28), and 45.00% (18) respectively. Explanations
for such high replacement of personal vehicles with DRS can be attributed to the higher
degree of car ownership among these cohorts (Figure 3.3). Crosstabulation was
performed comparing age and mode of transportation substituted for DRS. The results
indicated that there is very strong evidence of a relationship between age and the mode of
transportation substituted for DRS (Chi-Square = 86.815, df = 40, p < 0.001).
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Figure 3.3: Age compared with replacement of transport mode with DRS

Users were asked whether they connected to other transport modes such as buses,
streetcars or subways to complete their trips. All age groups responded "Never" in more
than 50% of cases with "Sometime" in about one-third of cases. The purpose of this
question was to determine whether DRS was being used intermodally to connect with
public transportation. The reply "Sometimes" indicates an area for future research and
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application of DRS. Perhaps in less densely populated areas, DRS could be promoted as a
means of building an itinerary that is less reliant on one's personal vehicle (Figure 3.4).

Figure 3.4: Age compared with "When using dynamic ridesharing as a passenger, do you
connect to other transport modes such as buses, streetcars, or subways to complete your
trip?"
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Users were asked about how many people on average, including themselves, were
passengers in a vehicle. The responses were one, two, or three or more. This question
tries to explore the fundamental benefit of DRS, which is the ability to fill empty vehicle
seats thereby reducing road congestion through the efficient use of lane capacity. There
was normal distribution among the responses for the two younger cohorts, 18 to 34.
However, an anomaly is observed in the 18 to 24 group showing a higher response rate
for "three or more" than all other age groups. Among the 18 to 24-year-olds who were
asked the number of passengers in a vehicle, 34% responded with "three or more". This
response rate was approximately two times higher than all other age groups.
Crosstabulation analysis for age groups (Question 22) compared to number of passengers
in vehicle (Question 9) indicate that there is very strong evidence of a relationship
between the variables (Chi-square = 39.097, df = 15, p < 0.001).
Respondents were asked "To what extent is not owning a car a significant factor
in choosing dynamic ridesharing?". The question answer was comprised of a scale of one
to five with one indicating "Most significant" and five indicating "Not significant".
Respondents who were DRS drivers were given the choice of opting out of this question.
All age groups tended to have a high response rate indicating that the lack of car
ownership was either "Less significant" or "Not significant" as a factor in choosing DRS.
However, the 18-24 group indicated that 24.42% (14) felt that not owning a car was
"Most significant" in their decision to use DRS. The response rate of the 18-24 cohort
was significantly higher than the response to "Most significant" of all other groups.
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In the survey, Question 16 was included to explore respondents' attitudes
regarding the environmental benefits of DRS. In an early study of DRS, Levofsky and
Greenberg (2001) examined the environmental degradation attributed severe traffic
congestion. More recently, Deakin, Frick, and Shively (2012) conducted a feasibility
study conducted at the University of California at Berkeley. According to the results of
the study, participants stated that their primary reason for sharing rides was to save time
and money. However, a secondary reason given was to reduce environmental impacts
caused by driving. The question in our survey went more directly to the issue and asked,
"To what extent is reducing impacts on the physical environment a significant factor in
choosing dynamic ridesharing?" The 55 to 64 cohort had the highest response rate
favoring DRS as a means to reduce negative impacts on the environment (Figure 3.5).
The 55 to 64 group rated that is was "Moderately important", 37.50% (15). The group
also had the lowest negative response among all groups, i.e. "Not important", 22.50% (9).
When users were asked, "To what extent is using dynamic ridesharing a better
option than using a regular taxi or hired limousine?", on a scale of one to five, with one
meaning "Better" and five meaning "Not better", all cohorts entered a response rate above
50% in the "Better" category. The 55 to 64 group had the highest response rate of
"Better" at 62.50% (25) (Figure 3.6). The unanimity of the response was similar in
question 19 which asked, "To what extent is using dynamic ridesharing a better option
than using public transportation?". All except cohort, 65 or older, answered with a
highest response rate of "Better" on the scale. The 65 or older group gave its highest
rating to "Somewhat better", 45.00% (9) (Figure 3.7).

68

Finally, age categorized respondents were asked to rate on a scale of one to five
the question, "Would you consider moving to a larger home in an area with limited or no
public transportation if dynamic ridesharing was a reliable option?" . Response by the age
cohorts was similarly mixed as with gender in the previous section. The younger groups,
18 to 24 and 25 to 34, gave highest response rate to "Moderately consider", 33.96% (18)
and 36.56% (34) respectively. The older groups were unanimous in giving the highest
response to "Not consider".
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Figure 3.5. Age compared with Question 16 "To what extent is reducing impacts on the
physical environment a significant factor in choosing dynamic ridesharing?"
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Figure 3.6. Age compared with Question 18 "To what extent is using dynamic
ridesharing a better option than using a regular taxi or hired limousine?"
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Figure 3.7. Age compared to Question 19 "To what extent is using dynamic ridesharing a
better option than using public transportation?"
3.3.3 Demographic comparison based on educational attainment
The survey asked respondents to report their highest level of education completed.
The majority of respondents reported educational attainment from "Some college" to
"Completed graduate school", 98.04% (302). There were zero respondents reporting the
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following: "Primary school" and "Some high school". The following categories had one
respondent each: "Did not attend school", and "Vocational or trade school". It appears to
be sufficient to let the basic statistics stand as they are due to the nature of the data being
skewed so greatly towards college educated respondents. Future research into reasons
why individuals below college level education are nearly absent may be necessary.
Ethnicity in question 25 on the survey was also skewed toward White at 90% (271). In
the United States, there are differences in educational attainment by race with attainment
higher for Whites and Asians than for African-Americans and Hispanics (Ryan &
Siebens, 2009).
3.2.4 Demographic comparison based on race
When asked to identify their ethnicity respondents reported White with near
unanimity, 90%, (271). The remaining 10% was comprised of Black or AfricanAmerican, 0.97%, (3), Asian, 4.55% (14), and multiple races, 6.49% (20). Two groups
reported zero respondents: American Indian or Alaskan Native, and Native Hawaiian or
other Pacific Islander. We included White and Non-White Hispanic cohorts in the
original survey (Appendix A).1
Since Question 25 was skewed heavily toward the White category, little statistical
evidence could be gleaned that was relevant to DRS. When race was compared to
Question 31, "Which of the following best describes the principal industry of your
employment?", Whites and Asians had similar response rates for the two most often
1

White and Non-White Hispanic cohorts were deleted from the live instrument due to error in the survey
administration by the vendor.
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chosen industries: Education, and Telecommunication, Technology, Internet, and
Electronics: 9.63% (26), 12.22% (33), and 14.29% (2), 28.57% (4) respectively. AfricanAmericans selected Non-profit unanimously, 100% (3).
3.3.5 Demographic comparison based on housing tenure
When DRS users were asked about housing tenure, they reported a near even split
between renting, 49.03% (151) and owning their homes, 48.38% (149). The remainder
was comprised of respondents who answered "other," 2.60% (8). All but one of the
"other" category referred to either living at home with a relative or in a college dorm.
One respondent reported renting and owning two residences.
Distribution was normal and evenly split when respondents named the DRS
platforms that they have used. As in other demographic groups, the majority of users had
chosen among Uber Black, UberX, and Lyft. UberX, Uber's basic ridesharing service,
was the most often reported with renters giving a response rate of 91.39% (138) and
homeowners responding lower at 75.17% (112). Homeowners tended to use Uber Black
more often than renters, 45.64% (68) and 27.15% (41) respectively. Uber Black is Uber's
premium service providing late model luxury cars and is primarily used for airport and
special event transportation.
When users were asked, "To what extent is not owning a car a significant factor in
choosing dynamic ridesharing?", renters and homeowners responded as in Figure 3.8.
Renters responded that not owning a car was a significant factor in choosing a DRS
service,25.83% (39). In contrast, homeowners responded that car ownership was not a
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significant factor, 38.93% (58). Respondents who were primarily DRS users were given
the opportunity to opt out of this question.
Respondents were asked in Question 16, "To what extent is reducing impacts on
the physical environment a significant factor in choosing dynamic ridesharing?", they
replied as in Figure 3.9. The majority in each cohort answered "Not important": renters
30.46% (46), and owners 34.90% (52). Further research on users' attitudes about DRS
would benefit promoting its environmentally beneficial offerings. The age cohort 55 to
64 appears to thus be far the only demographic group that appreciated this aspect of DRS
(Figure 3.5).
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Figure 3.8. Housing tenure compared to Question 15 "To what extent is not owning a car
a significant factor in choosing dynamic ridesharing?"

Question 20 asked users "Would you consider moving to a larger home in an area
with limited or no public transportation if dynamic ridesharing were a reliable option?"
The purpose of this question was to examine users' openness to DRS in less densely
populated areas. Renters tended to favor DRS in a less densely populated setting giving a
response rate of "Moderately consider" on the Likert scale question, 30.46% (46).
Homeowners gave a response of "Not consider", 42.28% (63), perhaps due to their
familiarity with suburban settings that are usually seen as the realm of the private
automobile.
3.2.6 Demographic comparison based on relationship status
When asked "Which of the following best describes your current relationship
status?", the split was even between "Married"/"In a domestic partnership or civil union",
47.40% (146) and "Single, never married"/"Single, but cohabitating with a significant
other" 48.38%, (149) (Figure 3.10) Widowed, divorced,
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Figure 3.9. Housing tenure compared to "To what extent is reducing impacts on the
physical environment a significant factor in choosing dynamic ridesharing?"

and separated comprised the smallest cohort with 4.22% (13), perhaps related to the fact
that there were fewer respondents in the 65 and above cohort, 6.54% (20) (Table 3.3).
Regarding relationship status, there was general unanimity among cohorts in
Question 17, "To what extent is not owning a car a significant factor in choosing dynamic
ridesharing?". Both the "Married"/"In a domestic partnership or civil union" and "Single,
never married"/"Single, but cohabitating with a significant other" groups gave highest
response rates to the combined scale answers "Less significant", and "Not significant",
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73.05% (103) and 55.55% (25) respectively (Figure 3.11). The results indicate that based
on relationship status, users were making choice to choose DRS irrespective of car
ownership
When users were asked which mode of transportation was most often being
replaced by DRS (Question 7), they responded as in Figure 3.12. As with demographic
groups previously examined in the survey, the majority were replacing their person car
and taxis with DRS. There is very strong evidence of a relationship between relationship
status and substitution of transportation mode with DRS (Chi-square = 89.768, df = 48, p
< 0.001).
3.3.7 Demographic comparison based on the number of available vehicles in
household
In Question 28, users were asked about the number of available vehicles in their
household (Figure 3.13). Vehicles included passenger cars, vans, light trucks, or
motorcycles.
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Figure 3.10. Question 27, relationship status of DRS users.
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Figure 3.11. Relationship status compared to Question 17 "To what extent is not owning
a car a significant factor in choosing dynamic ridesharing?"
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Figure 3.12. Relationship status compared with Question 7, "Which mode of
transportation are you most often replacing when you use dynamic ridesharing?"
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Figure 3.13. Question 28, "Number of available vehicles in your household."
The survey did not specify the type of vehicle. Vehicle availability per household is often
associated with income, energy consumption, and residential density (Brownstone &
Golob, 2009).
This study looked at income asking, "What is your approximate average
household income?" (Figure 3.14). The highest response rate was the "$200,000 and up"
category, 23.86% (73). High income correlated with the results of the vehicles per
household question. Users with zero vehicles per household had an even distribution of
average household income as is seen in Figure 3.15.
When users were asked about mode substitution, they responded as noted in
Figure 3.16. As with other demographic groups in the study, personal car, and taxi again
received the highest response rates. Users with five or more vehicles available most often
replaced their personal car 80.00% (4) of the time. There is very strong evidence of a
relationship between vehicles per household and transportation mode substitution (ChiSquare = 119.730, df = 40, p < 0.001).
Users were asked how many people, including themselves, were passengers in the
DRS vehicle. Based on the number of available vehicles per household the respondents
answered as in Figure 3.17. The response rate in the 5 or more category was once again
very high with users reporting three or more passengers per vehicle, 60.00% (3). There
was also evidence of a relationship between the number of vehicles available per
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household and number of passengers per vehicle (Chi-square = 27.608, df = 15, p <
0.05).
Question 10 asked DRS drivers to estimate the total monthly cost for gasoline,
auto insurance, car payment, maintenance, tolls, and parking. The highest response rate
was reported in households with five or more vehicles available, 40.00% (2) (Figure
3.18). Also, there was very strong evidence of a relationship between vehicles per
household and the DRS driver's cost for vehicle maintenance (Chi-square = 74.158, df =
25, p < 0.001).
Not owning a car was predictably rated "Most significant" on a Likert scale to
users in households with zero vehicles available, 56.60% (30) (Figure 3.19). Users who
were DRS drivers were given the opportunity to opt out of this question. Thus, there was
very strong evidence of a relationship between zero vehicles available per household and
not owning a car when choosing to use DRS (Chi-square = 134.460, df = 25, p < 0.001).
3.3.8 Demographic comparison based on employment status
When users were asked about employment status, they responded as in Figure
3.20. The majority of respondents reported being employed full time, 74.35% (229).
3.3.9 Demographic comparison based on enrollment as a student
User were asked about their status as a student (Question 30) and reported as in
Figure 3.21. The overwhelming majority reported they were not currently enrolled as a
student, 84.09% (259).
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3.3.10 Demographic comparison based on principal industry of employment
When users were asked about their principal industry of employment, they responded as
in Table 3.4. Four industries were dominant among DRS users: Advertising and
marketing, 4.56% (14), Education, 9.77% (30), Nonprofit, 7.82% (24), and
Telecommunications, Technology, Internet, and Electronics, 12.70% (39). When asked in
Question 5, "How long have you been using dynamic ridesharing?", all four of the
principal, dominant industries gave high response rates to six months to one year, and
more than one year. There is evidence of a relationship between the principal industry of
employment and the length of time one uses a DRS service (Chi-square = 109.579, df =
80, p < 0.05).
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Figure 3.14. Question 32, "What is your approximate average household income?"
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Figure 3.15. Vehicles per household compared with Question 32 "What is your
approximate average income?"
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Figure 3.16. Number of available vehicles per household compared with Question 7
"Which mode of transportation are you most often replacing when you use dynamic
ridesharing?"
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Figure 3.17. Number of vehicles per household (Question 28) compared with Question 9
"When using dynamic ridesharing as a passenger, on average how many people,
including yourself, were passengers in the vehicle?"
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Figure 3.18. Number of vehicles per household (Question 28) compared with Question
10 "If you are primarily a driver, on average what is your total monthly cost for gasoline,
auto insurance, car payment (if applicable), maintenance, tolls, and parking."
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Figure 3.19. Number of vehicles per household (Question 28) compared with Question
15 "To what extent is not owning a car a significant factor in choosing dynamic
ridesharing?"
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Figure 3.20. Question 29, "Which of the following categories best describes your
employment status?"
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Figure 3.21. Question 30, "Are you currently enrolled as a student?"
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Table 3.4:
Which of the following best describes the principal industry of your employment?

Response
Percent

Response
Count

Advertising & Marketing

4.6%

14

Agriculture

0.0%

0

Airlines & Aerospace (including Defense)

1.0%

3

Automotive

0.3%

1

Business Support & Logistics

3.3%

10

Construction, Machinery, and Homes

1.6%

5

Education

9.8%

30

Entertainment & Leisure

2.9%

9

Finance & Financial Services

7.2%

22

Food & Beverages

2.6%

8

Government

2.0%

6

Healthcare & Pharmaceuticals

9.1%

28

Insurance

1.6%

5

Manufacturing

3.3%

10

Nonprofit

7.8%

24

Retail & Consumer Durables

2.9%

9

Real Estate

2.0%

6

Telecommunications, Technology, Internet & Electronics

12.7%

39

Transportation & Delivery

1.6%

5

Utilities, Energy, and Extraction

1.0%

3

I am currently not employed

8.1%

25

Answer Options

93

Other (please specify)

14.7%
answered questions

45
306

N = 306

3.3.11 Demographic comparison based on US region
The DRS survey was divided into nine US regions (Figures 3.23 & 3.23):
1. New England (Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode
Island,
Connecticut)
2. Middle Atlantic (New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania)
3. East North Central (Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin)
4. West North Central (Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas)
5. South Atlantic (Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia, West
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida)
6. East South Central (Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi)
7. West South Central (Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas)
8. Mountain (Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona,
Utah, Nevada)
9. Pacific (Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, Hawaii)

As a demographic group, DRS users by US region are represented in the bar chart
in Figure 3.24 The Pacific region represents the largest cohort with 28.53% (214) user.
The Eastern Seaboard combined (regions 1, 2, and 5) the most users, 38.54% (289).
When users were asked how long they used DRS, almost all regions gave the
highest response rate to "More than one year". Only the West South Central region
divided between "Less than one month" and "More than one year", 28.57% (4) each
respectively (Figure 3.24).
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When users were asked "Which mode of transportation are you most often
replacing when you use dynamic ridesharing?", they responded as in Figure 3.26. Two
regions, South Atlantic and East South Central more than any others used DRS to
substitute their person car, 59.62% (31), and 66.67% (6) (Figure 3.25). There was strong
evidence of a relationship between US region and mode of transportation substituted for
DRS (Chi-Square = 96.316, df = 64, p < 0.05).
Users were asked “To what extent is reducing impacts on the physical
environment a significant factor in choosing dynamic ridesharing?" and they responded
as in Figure 3.26. The regions that gave the highest response rates of "Moderately
important" on the Likert scale were New England, West North Central, South Atlantic,
and Middle Atlantic, 47.06% (8), 37.50% (6), 32.69% (17), and 29.27% (12)
respectively. The region that cared the least about the environmental significance of
choosing DRS was the Mountain region, rating it as "Not important", 50.00% (9).
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Figure 3.22. Respondents were divided into nine US regions.
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Figure 3.23. Respondents were representative of nine US regions
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Figure 3.24. US region compared to Question 5, "How long have you been using
dynamic ridesharing?"
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Figure 3.25. US region compared to Question 7, "Which mode of transportation are you
most often replacing when you use dynamic ridesharing?"
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Figure 3.26. US region compared with Question 16, To what extent is reducing impacts
on the physical environment a significant factor in choosing dynamic ridesharing?
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3.4 Conclusions

As shown in the analysis of the demographic groups, the data indicated
statistically significant differences among subgroups were compared to hypothetical
situations regarding the current state of DRS. Many of these differences, however, were
based on small segments of subgroups, some representing 1 to 5 respondents out of the
total sample. Thus, these smaller differences are not likely to yield practical suggestions
for further implementation or improvement of DRS. Additional research with more
focused survey questions and a larger sample can assist in providing more conclusive
results.
From the data, several assumptions could easily be hypothesized regarding the
demographic profile of a typical DRS user. Although some real differences exist, it is
obvious that many subgroups were not different. This suggests that the different
demographic subgroups shared similar evaluations of DRS. Below are some implications
of the demographic results and how they can be interpreted for further research.
3.4.1 Implications regarding the race subgroup
Overall, the ethnicity of the sample was predominately White, 90%, (271). There
was some significant response rate from the Asian and multiple races subgroups, 4.55%
(14) and 6.49% (20) respectively. The strikingly low representation of AfricanAmericans in the sample, 0.97% (3), would suggest additional research.
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Based on the results of this survey, the overwhelmingly White representation
supports anecdotal evidence suggesting DRS drivers are statistically more likely to be
White than traditional urban taxi drivers. The author tested UberX while at a conference
in Chicago during the spring of 2015. UberX was used to make three local trips: two
within the city, and one to the airport. All UberX trips were in vehicles driven by what
appeared to be people of European or South Asian ancestry. UberX vehicles are not
easily identified with external graphics; however, traditional taxis in Chicago bear the
usual markings of the company and the fact that it is a vehicle for hire. Based on a nonrepresentative visual sample, traditional taxis were predominately driven by people who
appeared to be of East Asian or Sub-Saharan African ancestry. These casual observations
are not suggested to be rigorous scientific analysis. However, they do provide a basis for
future research.
3.4.2 Implications regarding the age subgroup
The data suggested that DRS users tend to be "millennials" or people born
between 1980 and 2004. As a single cohort, 18 to 34-year-olds represented 47% (144) of
the respondents. What is significant regarding this cohort is the consumer research
showing these respondents trending away from purchasing personal vehicles and shifting
their focus instead to social media and its supporting technologies (Nelson, 2015).
Further research needs to explore whether this shift is due to economic factors, such as a
weak economy and high student loan debt, or if there is a fundamental change in progress
towards car ownership
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3.4.3 Implications regarding subgroup attitudes toward environmental benefits
The environmental benefits of DRS include less congestion and resource
consumption due to more efficient use of vehicles. This aspect of DRS seemed to escape
most respondents who tended to give negative response rates when asked if they included
environmental benefits in their selection process of DRS. Previous research by Deakin,
Frick, and Shively (2012) indicated that saving money and time were the primary
decision factors for choosing DRS. Little has changed in this attitude since 2012, perhaps
suggesting that DRS platforms may want to stress the environmental benefits of
ridesharing in their promotional material. It is quite possible that he layman fails to make
the rather complex transportation planning connections between utilizing as many seats
as possible in a vehicle and the consequences of a national fleet comprised primarily of
SOVs.
3.4.4 Implications regarding users' attitude towards public transportation
In Question 19, the majority of respondents rated DRS as a better option than
public transportation. The highest response rate was "Better", 46.75% (144). The lowest
response rate was "Not better", 2.60% (8). Considering that most DRS services need a
densely populated area to work reliably, one can assume that most respondents lived in
compact urban areas. The implication of the data's negative response towards public
transportation reveals an overall failure of the national public transportation system. One
could extrapolate from these results that DRS, implemented on a larger scale, could
ultimately threaten the existence of public transportation as municipalities see ridership
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decline with DRS use. Already, automobile manufacturers are developing multipassenger transport vehicles based on DRS principals (Badger, 2015). The Ford Motor
company is currently experimenting with a van that is connected to a ridesharing app.
The strategy for this is two-fold: anticipation of the decline in vehicle purchases by
millennials and the eventual need by municipalities for a new public transportation
vehicle that is responsive to users' input and more flexible in its destinations. The
experimental vehicle called a "dynamic social shuttle) it is not being developed as a
fixed-route system, but one that offers passengers direct door-to-door service.
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Chapter 4

Legal and Administrative Issues Affecting Dynamic Ridesharing Platforms in
San Francisco and New York

Abstract
Dynamic ridesharing (DRS) platforms have been creating disruption in the urban
transportation industry by offering both drivers and passengers attractive alternatives to
traditional taxi and limousine services. Drivers are using it to earn income utilizing their
personal vehicles. Passengers are attracted to the simplicity of summoning a ride with the
touch of an icon on their smartphones. Other features, such as cashless payment, tipping
included in the price, and seeing how soon your car will arrive in real-time on a
smartphone map are among the other major features that have captured the attention of
many urban dwellers. According to statistics gathered by the New York Tax and
Limousine Commission the DRS platforms Uber now outnumbers all yellow medallion
taxis (Pramuk, 2015).
Much of the success of DRS platforms, however, has been hard fought. In each
city a DRS platforms enters, regulatory agencies grapple with protests from incumbent
industries that stand to lose to the disruptors. In some cities, highly-valued classic taxi

106

medallions, permits used to operate taxis and a method of regulation dating from the
1930s, are threatened with becoming obsolete.
This review examines a chronology of the legal and administrative challenges to
DRS platforms in two premiere cities, San Francisco and New York. The cities each
have their unique role in the disruption process and by comparing and contrasting events,
a picture emerges of similarities and differences that provide the context for this new and
complex transportation service.
Keywords: dynamic ridesharing, DRS, New York, San Francisco, disruption innovation,
taxis, regulation, Uber. Lyft.
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4. Introduction
Dynamic ridesharing (DRS) applications (APPS) such as Uber and Lyft have
gained mass popularity in cities across the United States and globally. San Francisco and
New York are not exceptions and were chosen for this study to compare the legal and
administrative issues that DRS services faced in order to overcome resistance to
competing stakeholders and prosper in these challenging urban environments. The cities
for this review were selected due to their unique for-hire vehicle (FHV) histories. Due to
the cities' statures as centers of innovation, (i.e. for San Francisco technological and for
New York financial and cultural) the legal and administrative issues facing DRS
providers are being watched carefully by all who have a stake in the operations of urban
transportation. Their outcomes will possibly be precedents for the future direction of
DRS. Thus, both cities can be viewed as test beds for the disruption of the transportation
industry by DRS.
Historically, San Francisco's "taxi problem" can be traced to the political
environment of the 1970s when organizations sought to deregulate many industries by
removing government controls and handing much decision making back to the private
sector. In San Francisco's case, this was to address perceptions of unfairness and
corruption in the taxi industry (Newsham, 2000). In New York, regulation of the taxicab
industry can be traced back to 1937 when then-Mayor Fiorello H. La Guardia signed the
Haas Act. The law introduced licensing of taxis and the medallion system. The
medallion, an aluminum plate affixed to the hood of a vehicle grants official status to the
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owner to use the taxi to transport passengers for a regulated fee. The number of
medallions issued by the city was fixed then, as it still is in 2015, and can only be
changed by the Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC), the municipal agency that has
jurisdiction over FHVs (Van Gelder, 1996; New York City Taxi and Limousine
Commission, 2015). New York medallion prices rose to a high in late 2013, when two
medallions were sold for $1 million each, the highest price recorded since they were
issued in 1937 (Flegenheimer, 2013). As of 2015, medallion prices are dropping sharply
to an average of $805,000, likely due to the launches of DRS services like Uber, Lyft,
and SideCar (Barro, 2015) Some financial analysts have claimed that the medallion is
becoming obsolete as DRS continues to disrupt in cities whose taxicab industry uses this
system (Hickman, 2015; Barro, 2015). Fleet owners and private holders of taxi
medallions have become concerned that the traditional FHV industry will cease to exist
unless local and state governments step in immediately (Madhani, 2015). In light of this
concern, there was reassurance offered from government sources such as New York TLC
Commissioner Meera Joshi. Commissioner Joshi states that the core and the majority of
passengers in New York will still choose hand-hailing (Caruthers, 2015). The
commissioner bases evidence on her contention that the price of yellow taxi medallions is
not tied to the health of the greater industry. She cites the increasing value of the large
number of green all-borough2cabs as evidence that there is enough diversification within

2

In 2013, the TLC introduced the Boro Taxi program that has licensed uniquely green colored taxis to
serve areas of the city that have been commonly excluded by yellow medallion taxis. Green Boro Taxis
service all of the five boroughs of New York except south of West 110th and East 96th Streets in
Manhattan, and both La Guardia and John F. Kennedy International Airports in Queens.
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the industry to absorb Uber and other DRSs without threatening yellow taxi medallions
(Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1: TLC authorized green all-boro taxi licensed to serve areas of New York
normally excluded by yellow medallion taxis (Source: Author, 2014).

This study used primary and secondary sources from the internet to create a
chronology of legal and administrative issues that could be compared and contrasted with
each city. Similarities and differences among the issues exist for both San Francisco and
New York.
4.1 Methodology and Data Gathering
The process of gathering the data for the chronology required the use of primary
and secondary sources retrieved from Internet searches that were conducted for each of
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the case cities. Primary sources used to assemble the legal chronologies were mostly
taken from blogs and legal documents. Secondary sources included pertinent press
coverage in articles found in online versions of print newspapers, online news sources,
online versions of news magazines, and other mass media such as online television or
radio news programs.
4.2 San Francisco

4.2.1 Introduction
San Francisco's proximity to the Silicon Valley technopole has guaranteed its
place as a center of disruptive innovation (Castells & Hall, 1994). From this region,
companies have emerged that have left their imprint on society and business since the
mid-twentieth century. Companies such as Apple, Hewlett-Packard, Xerox, eBay, etc.,
have each been instrumental in the disruptive innovation of long-term industries
(Christensen, 2003). Its concentration of high-technology workers, Ph.D.s, and
entrepreneurs makes it a logical origination point and birthplace for Internet-enabled and
location-aware ridesharing services. San Francisco's role in the development of DRS is
unique, yet as an originator the city has been a template for the global proliferation of
companies like Uber and Lyft. For its foundational role, it was selected as the leading
case study city for a chronological review of legal and major transportation issues
affecting DRS.
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The city's image of confident tech workers and cutting-edge services is a natural fit for
DRS, which promises to be the new method of urban transportation for the coming
century. That promise, however, has been impeded at times by parties whose established
place in the urban transportation matrix is threatened by DRS.
4.2.2 Background
Prior to DRS's arrival in San Francisco in the form of Uber in 2009, and Lyft and
SideCar in 2012, the city's traditional yellow taxi industry already had a long-standing
reputation for poor and unreliable service. A brief review of San Francisco's taxi industry
of the past 35 years will help to instruct why the citizens of this innovative city were
eager to accept a new, untested model that would not only reform, but remake urban
transportation.
The late 1970s were a time when deregulation of transportation industries were
seen as a solution to problems inherent in these organizations. A major event of this
period in history was the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. The Act was a federal law
designed to remove government control of the commercial aviation industry. Other
transportation modes followed with their versions of laws calling for either deregulation
or regulation. In the case of San Francisco, Proposition K arrived in 1978 and required
that all taxis have permits issued only to natural individuals and in one name only
(Charter Reform Working Group, 2007). Proposition K also imposed a driving
requirement so that only working taxicab drivers could hold permits.
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Hence, the history of the San Francisco's "taxi problem" can be traced to the year
1978 when ballot initiative Proposition K was passed to correct perceptions of unfairness
and corruption within the industry (Newsham, 2000). Under Proposition K, the city of
San Francisco would issue taxi medallions to persons paying an annual fee (San
Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, 2014). The taxi medallions used as
operating permits was an old concept dating back to 1937 in New York (Van Gelder,
1996). Under Proposition K's medallion system, the owner leases it to an experienced taxi
driver who uses it to generate income. The arrival of Proposition K also placed a limit on
the number of medallions that could be authorized at any time. Limits on the number of
medallions were gradually increased to keep pace with demand, however, as late as 2014,
San Franciscans were still complaining about the difficulty of ordering a taxicab (Said,
2014).
According to Newsham (2000), the medallion system implemented in 1978 was
an attempt to discourage speculators from bidding up the prices of medallions. Thus,
medallions were only awarded to individuals who would rent taxis from established firms
rather than hold on to them for financial speculation. Although Proposition K's original
intent was to protect workers by removing medallions from speculators, other problems
were unmet. Since 1978 taxi drivers had been operating as independent contractors of the
established cab companies. This system ensured income for the cab companies who were
paid by drivers to lease taxicabs. Thus, the cab company was guaranteed an income
regardless of the amount or lack of money generated by the cab during the driver's shift.
Cab companies also benefited from the independent contractor relationship with drivers
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because they were relieved of paying social security and disability taxes and were
shielded from the threat of unionization (Newsham, 2000). These were all items that
would normally be required of companies when workers are actual employees. For most
of the drivers, independent contractor status was seen as a benefit that freed them from
direct supervision by supervisors and granted them the ability to work the hours they
preferred (Newsham, 2000). Under the Proposition K system, however, the seeds of the
San Francisco taxi problem were planted. Passengers suffered most from this system
because there were no rules or regulations that explicitly required enough drivers to be
available at any given time. Requests for drivers would be broadly transmitted across the
city regardless of the driver's distance from a waiting passenger, or whether his or her
taxicab was on-duty and unavailable. Also, drivers determined their schedules and could
decide to end a shift and not accept a passenger's request.
The flawed system introduced in 1978 with Proposition K deprived San
Francisco's taxi patrons of reliable service for many decades. Attempts at reform were
often favored by medallion owners and taxicab companies instead of passengers. With
this background, it is clear to see how DRS arrived in San Francisco and was
immediately embraced by the public. The entrepreneurs behind the launches of DRS
platforms in San Francisco were aware of the "taxi problem" and applied the new
enabling technologies that brought improved service to the city. It is worth noting,
however, that the issue of independent contractor status has returned with the arrival of
Uber, Lyft, and SideCar, (Wood, 2015). Recent developments involving DRS drivers will
be examined in the section on the chronology of legal issues. The following section
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summarizes legal and major transportation issues that affect the operation of DRS in San
Francisco. Following San Francisco, there will be a chronological review of DRS issues
in New York.
4.2.3 Chronology
San Francisco Metro Transit Authority and the California Public Utilities
Commission order UberCab to cease and desist, October, 2010. Uber was launched
in San Francisco in June 2010 under its original name, UberCab. The legal issue cited, a
regulatory action initiated jointly by two government agencies is one of the earliest legal
actions taken against the young company. On October 19, 2010, UberCab received a
cease and desist letter issued jointly by the San Francisco Transit Authority (SFMTA)
and the California Public Utilities Commission. An order of cease and desist is a legal
document sent to an entity, in this case, a business, instructing them to stop allegedly
unlawful activity and no to longer take up the activity again. A deadline usually
accompanies the cease and desist document warning the company that failure to comply
will result in a penalty, such as being sued (Legal Information Institute, 2015). The
unlawful activity alleged was the operation of a taxi-like business without a license and
not providing insurance equivalent to a commercial taxi's insurance (Kolodny, 2010).
UberCab's chief executive at the time, Ryan Graves, responded to the legal
document by saying that the company believes it is offering a service in compliance with
the alluded to regulations. UberCab contended that they were offering an innovative new
form of transportation technology that the SFMTA and CPUC have not yet been able to
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evaluate for the purposes of regulation. Graves offered to educate the agencies to forge
new sets of regulations based on the technology offered. Despite Graves' offer to educate,
UberCab was still perceived by those outside the technology industry as a company that
operates similarly to a taxicab cab, but without the required license and insurance
(Siegler, 2010). It was during the time of this particular cease and desist letter that the
company changed its name from UberCab to simply Uber to circumvent association with
the traditional taxi industry (Kolodny, 2010)
CPUC enters into operation agreement with Uber, December 2012. On December 12,
2012, the CPUC issued a statement and said it would evaluate DRS services like Uber.
The proceeding was intended to protect public safety and to encourage technological
innovation in urban transportation (California Public Utilities Commission, 2013). This
action by the state regulatory agency set in motion the eventual acceptance and regulation
of DRS as a valid alternative transportation mode. It was in 2013 that the CPUC would
eventually draft rules that defined periods when a DRS service handled providing
insurance and when a driver's insurance would take effect. This period would also lead to
definitions regarding inspections of vehicles and background checks on drivers. With this
initial agreement by the CPUC, cease and desist notices to Uber were suspended pending
the outcome of the agency's rulemaking (California Public Utilities Commission, 2013a).
Uber drivers file a class-action lawsuit alleging that Uber cheats them out of tips.
August, 2013. Although there was a case settled in June of 2015 where a California
judge determined that Uber drivers were employees of the company and not independent
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contractors, in 2013 the independent contractor status of drivers was accepted as the
relationship drivers had with a DRS platform . Back then, as now, drivers depended on
the DRS's app to collect fares and reimburse them minus the administrative fee that was
typically 20% (Hubpages, 2014). The remaining 80% of the fare was deposited into a
bank account designated by the driver. Uber stated that tips to the driver were calculated
into the fare so that passengers can simply use the phone app and avoid handling cash
(Brustein, 2013). However, in the a class-action lawsuit filed in California in August,
2013, drivers had alleged that Uber keeps prices artificially low as a way to compete with
other platforms, thus depriving them of tip-income they would normally collect as
traditional taxicab drivers. This lawsuit also alleged that Uber drivers are employees
rather than independent contractors. See also the heading "Uber Technologies v. Barbara
Berwick, Jun 2015" where an Uber driver was successful in securing a ruling from the
California Labor Commission stating that she was, in fact an employee of the company.
The ruling in her favor required Uber to pay her for business expenses she during the two
months she was a driver for Uber (Huet, 2015).
CPUC established rules for DRS service and created a new regulatory category
called Transportation Network Companies, September, 2013. DRS platforms were
beginning to become ubiquitous by 2013. Uber, Lyft, and SideCar were expanding in
cities across the United States. Uber's expanded internationally with a 2011 launch in
Paris, France. UberX was launched in 2012 in San Francisco and New York initially
focusing on smaller hybrid cars. UberX is a non-black car version of Uber specifically
designed for competition with the other lower-cost rideshare platforms (Gannes, 2012).
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Government regulators were often encountering situations with DRS services where no
rulings existed due to the newness of the mode.
In San Francisco on September 19, 2013, California became the first U.S. state
to regulate DRS services with a ruling issued by the CPUC (California Public Utilities
Commission, 2013b). The regulatory model created by the CPUC has become a template
emulated by many DRS services in other U.S. states. The ruling made DRS platforms
such as UberX, Lyft, and SideCar subject to CPUC jurisdiction. As a result of the
regulation, a new category for DRS platforms was created called Transportation Network
Company (TNC). TNCs were defined as DRS services that used smartphones and
Internet technology to match riders with drivers (California Public Utilities Commission,
2013b). The CPUC also set mandatory rules on driver and criminal background checks
for drivers who register with a TNC.
Much needed clarification on insurance was offered by the new CPUC rules. The
regulatory body set three "defined periods" to help clarify when insurance applies Period
One is "App open-waiting for a match"; the driver is in his/her vehicle and turns on the
app. Period Two is "Match is accepted- but the passenger is not yet picked up"; the
driver is on his/her way to retrieve the passenger. Period Three is "Passenger in the
vehicle and until the passenger safely exits vehicle". The CPUC wanted to ensure
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Table 4.1: Summary of CPUC insurance regulations for TNCs (California Public
Utilities Commission, 2013c).
State of mobile device
Not logged
on/
not available
Logged on/
Not on trip

Logged on/
driver accepts
trip

Period 1

Periods 2 &
3

CPUC defined insurance coverage
app off

Driver's personal auto insurance

app on

Driver's personal insurance, PLUSContingent liability coverage (also
called "insurance gap" coverage (1)

UberX

Lyft

SideCar

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

app on

TNC must provide primary
commercial insurance in the amount of
one million dollars. This may be
satisfied by TNC if: (a)commercial
X
insurance is maintained by driver (2);
(b) commercial insurance maintained
by the TNC; or (c) a combination of
(a) and (b)
Logged on/
Period 3
app on
TNC must provide uninsured (UM)
during trip/
and underinsured (UIM) insurance in
when trip ends
the amount of one million dollars. This
may be satisfied by TNC if:
X
(a)commercial insurance is maintained
by driver (2); (b) commercial
insurance maintained by the TNC; or
(c) a combination of (a) and (b)
1. TNC provides contingent liability coverage if/when driver's personal auto insurer denies
2. TNC must verify that the driver's insurance covers the vehicle for TNC purposes

there were no insurance gaps when drivers were getting paid to give rides and achieved
this with the new regulations (G. Mathieux, personal communication, October 9, 2014).
Despite the legal acceptance of TNCs throughout California's cities and some
jurisdictions throughout the United States, airports have stood vehemently opposed to
TNC operations on airport property. Their hesitancy ostensibly stems from a concern
about additional traffic congestion at airports. Some TNCs, such as Wingz, circumvent
the airport issue since they do not use a smartphone app, but instead accept reservations
for airport pickups and drop offs through their website only. The CPUC and the City of
San Francisco recognize that web-based companies such as Wingz historically had
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customers reserve rides via the web. Thus, web-based platforms such as Wingz are
exempt from the Period One and Period Two phases of insurance coverage. However,
web-based TNCs are required to provide coverage for defined Period Three. Defined
period three is when the passenger enters the vehicle and until he/she safely exits (G.
Mathieux, personal communication, October 6, 2014). Allowing TNCs to enter most U.S.
airports is still being negotiated at the time of this writing.
Family sues Uber for wrongful death, January, 2014. On December 31, 2013, a sixyear-old girl, Sofia Liu, was struck and killed by an UberX driver in a San Francisco
crosswalk. In January, 2014, the girl's family filed a lawsuit against both the driver and
Uber Technologies, the parent company of UberX (Levine, 2014). The lawsuit contended
that the driver was logged on to the UberX app and was waiting to receive a ride request
from a potential passenger. This allegation would place him in Period 1 of the CPUC's
newly defined insurance requirements for TNCs. According to the CPUC's definition of
Period One, the TNC, in this case, UberX, would be required to provide insurance
(Williams & Alexander, 2014). The driver of the UberX vehicle has claimed that he had
the app on and was waiting for a ride match. However, Uber claims that the they are not
liable because the driver was an independent contractor and not an employee. Uber
further claims that the driver was not carrying a fare or going to pick up a fare and had no
reason for his smartphone app to be open (Williams, 2014).
California regulators and the National Federation of the Blind investigate claims
that DRS drivers refuse rides to passengers with service animals, May, 2014. The
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CPUC, the state regulatory body that acquired jurisdiction of DRS services as of
September, 2013, and the SFMTA, the municipal agency with jurisdiction over the city's
taxicabs, joined with the National Federation of the Blind to investigate claims that DRS
drivers, and Uber in particular, were refusing rides to blind passengers with service
animals. A major problem for DRS services has been their avoidance of the issue of how
to handle passengers who are disabled. Traditional carriers often point to this issue as an
area where companies like Uber and Lyft are benignly excused by regulators from
providing accommodation for passengers with special needs (Farr, 2014). Until this
event, regulators had been lax in enforcing discrimination under the laws of the
Americans with Disability Act of 1990 (ADA). This investigation would eventually lead
to a lawsuit filed in May 2015. See heading " Disabled groups suing Uber and Lyft, May,
2015" in this section.
San Francisco's District Attorney's office files lawsuit against Uber, Lyft, and
SideCar for alleged unlawful business practices, December, 2014. (unlawful business
practices/background checks, illegal fees) The district attorneys of San Francisco and Los
Angeles sued Uber over alleged unlawful business practices that included charging
passengers a $4 fee that was meant to cover fees for passengers traveling to the airport.
Other carriers charge a similar fee that is ultimately collected by the airport. The lawsuit
alleges that Uber has been charging the fee and pocketing it rather than forwarding it to
the airport (Roberts, 2014).
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In the lawsuit, Uber is also charged with being out of compliance with regards to
performing adequate background checks on potential drivers. By law, Uber cannot deny
access to their platform by drivers who have been convicted of a felony beyond seven
years into the past (Macmillan, 2014) Lyft reached a settlement with prosecutors and
agreed to it would wait until the necessary permits and approvals were issued to resume
picking up passengers at the airport (Lien & Mitchell, 2014).
Some still buy San Francisco taxi medallions, January, 2015. While medallion prices
fall nationally due to DRS services like UberX and Lyft, some still see the medallion as
an investment that is worth buying at low prices. According to San Francisco cab driver,
Gerard Rowland, medallion prices had fallen in the past when new transportation projects
open, such as the BART urban rail system that began service in 1972. Medallion prices in
San Francisco by the SFMTA. As in New York, medallions in San Francisco grant the
owner the right to operate a taxicab either by themselves or by renting it to other drivers
or taxicab companies (Said, 2015).
Disabled groups were suing Uber and Lyft, May, 2015. Uber and Lyft, the two major
DRS services, were named as defendants in lawsuits filed in both California and Texas.
The lawsuits illustrate the lack of training that DRS drivers received, especially with
regards to regulatory issues such as being knowledgeable about the laws regarding ADA
compliance. The California lawsuit was brought by the National Federation of the Blind.
The lawsuit describes an incident such as an UberX driver who placed a blind passenger's
guide dog in the trunk of the vehicle. (Wieczer, 2015). Uber states that independent
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contractors who drive for their platform can transport blind or other disabled passenger
and that drivers who refuse such passengers are usually suspended. Lyft offered a similar
policy and added that drivers who refuse service animals must call a special hotline
number and have a medically verified reason for refusal. Without medical
documentation, Lyft's policy is similar in that refusal will result in suspension.
Suspension in the case of DRS platforms means that the driver loses access to the app.
The DRS services are careful to avoid wording that implies an employer/employee
relationship with drivers.
Uber's strategy to avoid discrimination accusations thus far has been its claim that
it is merely a technology company that matches independent contractors with potential
customers. Thus, Uber claims that as a technology company it is not bound to abide by
the same laws that are intended to regulate other providers of transportation services
(Wieczer, 2015).
California Labor Commission rules Uber drivers are employees, June, 2015. A
major event in the early life of DRS services occurred on June 16, 2015 when a ruling by
a judge for the California Labor Commission said that an Uber driver should be classified
as an employee of the company, and not as an independent contractor (Issac & Singer,
2015). The implications of this decision will possibly determine the future direction of
the sharing economy.
DRS is a significant part of the so-called sharing economy. The sharing economy
is a system of collaborative consumption where parties share services in real time using
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enabling technologies such as the Internet and mobile communication devices with global
positioning system (GPS) technology making them location aware (Botsman & Rogers,
2010). The business model for the sharing economy relies on technology companies with
low overhead that can match parties who are either seeking to sell or seeking to receive,
services. Thus, technology companies could be looked at as "platforms" facilitating
transactions with limited or no need for a large physical plant or large staff of employees.
Some parts of the sharing economy require traditional elements. For example, for-profit
companies like Zipcar, a division of Avis Rentals, relies on enabling technologies such as
smartphones and the Internet to allow customers to book cars (Figure 4.2). However,
Zipcar requires an inventory of vehicles and a physical place to park them. Employees
are needed to attend to both the inventory and physical facility that stores the vehicles
while not in use (Sundararajan, 2013). DRS services such as Uber, Lyft, and SideCar,
have thus far remained free of the constraints of inventory and physical plant because
they rely on independent contractors who provide their private vehicles.
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Figure 4.2: Unlike DRS services such as Uber
and Lyft, car sharing companies maintain and
fleet and a facility to store vehicles (Source:
John DiGianni)

The California Labor Commission decision in San Francisco, however, could
have major consequences for DRS services who relied on drivers offering their services
as independent contractors. Uber contends that the ruling's scope was limited to the
person who files the case (Moore, 2015). If the ruling sets a broad precedent, DRS
services would have to pay benefits to employees such as health care and payroll taxes. A
sharing economy under this scenario would not differ greatly from the
employer/employee economy of the past century.
4.3 New York
4.3.1 Introduction
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New York was chosen for comparison due to its long history of livery vehicles
and the regulation of that industry. Early for-hire electric vehicles began arriving on the
streets of New York by the end of the nineteenth century. As with today's technology that
has become associated with DRS, early automobiles were the cutting-edge technology of
that time in history. They were often too expensive for the average individual to
purchase. Hence, early taxicab companies were often fleets owned by entrepreneurs who
knew where to locate the best vehicles, and how to secure the financing to purchase them,
much like today's start-ups from the Silicon Valley.
In 1907, New York businessman Harry N. Allen was inspired to create one of the
city's earliest fleets. Allen was reacting to the high prices charged by independent drivers
in what he called "vehicular extortion" (Hodges, 2007). The solution, according to Allen,
was to start a company that would offer superior service compared with the status quo of
the day. A clean and modern fleet would appeal to passengers and become a popular
alternative. He purchases a fleet of sixty-five French manufacturer Darracq cabs that
were equipped with fare meters. Drivers wore matching uniforms. Allen's experiment
created a valuable service with a corporate identity. Ultimately, his New York Taxicab
Company was successful and prospered. Hence, taxicabs became the new standard for
transportation in the City of New York (Hodges, 2007).
The historical context was provided to illustrate parallels with the development of
DRS today in San Francisco. Disruptive innovation in the transportation industry had
taken place more than one hundred years ago in New York. As the city entered the period
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after World War I, its social atmosphere intensified as events such as the Jazz Age and
Prohibition collided (Hodges, 2007). In 1904, the city's new subway opened, three years
before Harry N. Allen's New York Taxicab Company. What was good for working
people, however, would not suffice for the nightlife of Manhattan. New York's social
nightlife in the 1920s saw the taxicab become a standard mode of urban transportation.
During this time, fleets were organized to the degree that they had an industry-dedicated
magazine. Cab News was an example of a magazine published by the fleet owners that
was used to promote their companies. The magazine was also used to mold an image of
the industry favorable to the fleet owners. News articles would paint an unflattering
picture of independent taxicab owner-operators as coarse individuals unworthy of
patronage (Hodges, 2007). This tactic is similar to the one used presently by Uber and
Lyft today who portray their drivers as clean-cut citizens owning well maintained late
model vehicle.
4.3.2 Background
In New York, privately owned fleets lease yellow taxi medallion vehicles to
drivers. A medallion is a small metal plate with information inscribed such as a serial
number, attached to the vehicle's hood. Medallions are sold by the city's Taxi and
Limousine Commission, a municipal regulatory body that has jurisdiction over all the
FHVs. The medallion allows the vehicles to be regulated and used as a for-hire livery
conveyance. Medallions were created in New York in 1937 under the Haas Act, signed
into law by then-Mayor Fiorello H. La Guardia. The Act was partially in response to a
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condition caused by the Great Depression when thousands of unregulated vehicles filled
Manhattan streets with men trying to earn a living.
Traditional taxis and limousines are temporarily leased to drivers who use the vehicle for
a specified shift, after which the vehicle is leased again at the end of his or her work shift
to the next driver who repeats the process. Thus, it is often the case that a New York
medallion cab is driven continuously for several or more 24-hour periods. The average
yellow New York medallion cab is driven 180 miles per shift. The New York yellow taxi
fleet can provide approximately 485,000 trips per day, most with an average trip distance
of 2.6 miles. Yellow taxi activity is primarily in Manhattan and accounts for 90.3% of all
pick-ups (Table 4.2) (New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission, 2014).
Table 4.2: Yellow taxi activity in New York, 2014.
Borough
Percent of all Taxi Pick-ups
Manhattan
90.3%
Bronx
0.9%
Brooklyn
3.1%
Queens
1.5%
Staten Island
0.8%
All Airports (JFK and LGA)
3.5%
New York City
100.0%
Source: New York Taxi and Limousine Commission, 2014 Taxicab Fact Book (2014)

On the other hand, DRS drivers are owner-operators. Hence, their vehicles sit idle
when not in use. From a monetary perspective there is more efficient use of the
traditional taxicab, however, from an environmental view, the vehicle's gasoline or diesel
engine continuously operates, thus contributing to anthropogenically induced
atmospheric GHGs. The operation of DRS vehicles is sometimes optimized by owners
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who will "share" the use of the vehicle with other drivers during hours when their nonworking hours.
Uber and other apps have allegedly filled a need, especially in areas where taxi
service was difficult to summon, mainly due to the nature of how they are regulated.
"Most" jurisdictions issue the medallions and place limits on how many there can per
year. Thus, if a city sets a medallion limit of 1,500, then only 1,500 taxis can operate.
Uber can dispatch as many cars as the system can handle at any one time. As of March
2015, there were more Uber vehicles operating in New York than yellow medallion
taxicabs. According the current TLC Commission Meera Joshi, there were 14,088 Uber
vehicles operating compared to 13,587taxis. (Pramuk, 2015). The following section is a
chronology of legal events, many regulatory that occurred in New York with the arrival
of DRS.
4.3.3 Chronology
Two taxi medallions fetch a price of $1 million each, October, 2011. Prior to the
arrival of Uber in New York, two taxi medallions sold for $1 million each. The price was
highest recorded sale in the city's history since the medallion system began in 1937. Back
then, the historical cost of a medallion was $10 (Grynbaum, 2011). This story is
significant because it occurs in the same month and year Uber was launched in New
York. DRS services such as Uber have made a direct impact on the medallion according
to research produced at HVM Capital, LLC, a hedge fund that publishes research on the
taxicab medallion industry (Badger, 2014). Medallion prices in many U.S. have fallen as
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DRS services continue to make inroads and replace traditional taxicabs (Hickman, 2015).
In Chicago, for example, medallion prices have dropped from a high of $375,000 in April
2014 to $150,000 by December 2014. Although the price fluctuation of medallions is not
a legal event, some medallions owners have sought to sue municipalities for value lost in
their medallions based on the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution (PR Newswire, 2015).
New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) does not authorize the use
of smartphones for cab-hailing apps, September, 2012. David S. Yassky, chairman of
the TLC, issues a statement saying that smartphone apps will not be allowed until
contracts with payment
UberTaxi pulls out of New York due to legal questions about whether its app
violated TLC guidelines, October, 2012. While passenger demand for the smartphone
app was high according to Uber's chief executive Travis Kalanick, drivers dropped out of
the program due to fears of reprisal from the TLC (Flegenheimer, 2012b). Mr. Kalanick
wrote on his blog that the TLC had tried to "squash the effort" (Kalanick, 2012).
New York Department of Financial Services orders SideCar and RelayRides to
cease and desist, May, 2013. Shortly after SideCar, the smallest of the major DRSs, was
launched in New York in March 2013, the New York Department of Financial Services
ordered that they and RelayRides, a peer-to-peer car-sharing3 service, cease and desist. In
3

The concept of short-term car rentals begins in 1948 in Switzerland where car ownership was prohibitive
during the post-war recovery period. Early programs in Europe starting in 1971 in France with "Procotip";
"Witkar" in Netherlands, 1973; "Green Cars" in U.K. late 1970s'; and "Vivalla Bil" in Sweden, 1983.
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the case of RelayRides, its chief executive officer, Ander Haddad, commented on his
blog that the company was suspending all service in the state because the New York
Department of Financial Services alleged that the company was not complying with
unique aspects of New York insurance law (Chernova, 2013). The New York
Department of Financial Services is the state's regulatory agency that supervises all
insurance companies that do business in the state.
TLC deputy commissioner joins Uber, May, 2014. An indication of where DRS is
going can be seen in the TLC deputy commissioner's departure and new employment by
Uber Technologies.

In the United States, Purdue University conducted research on car sharing from 1983 to 1986. The Short
Term Auto Rental (STAR) was established in San Francisco by a private company and ran from 1983 to
1985.
A common thread among these early programs is their quick failure rate usually attributed to poor planning.
Of the previously mentioned programs, only STAR based in San Francisco had positive results from the
consumer's perspective (Transportation Cooperative Research Program, 2005).
Car sharing in its current iteration has roots in Switzerland and Germany with programs dating to the late
1980s. Mobility Switzerland in 1987 is the first sizeable car sharing company based on the present model.
Mobility Switzerland is still a leading car share program in Europe. Statt Auto Berlin followed one year
later in 1988. Shortly afterward car sharing programs began to proliferate throughout Europe. By 2004,
there were 70,000 cars sharing members in Germany and 60,000 in Switzerland (Transportation
Cooperative Research Program, 2005).
By 1994, the concept of car sharing arrived in North America n Quebec City with Auto-Com, which later
became Communauto. In the United States, the first large-scale program, CarSharing Portland, grew
rapidly from its beginning in 1998. As of 2008 there were 14 active car sharing programs in Canada and 19
in the United States. By 2009, there were approximately 319,000 cars sharing members with 7,500
vehicles available to them in North America. The four largest providers serve 99% and 95.2% of the
membership, respectively in the United States and Canada (Shaheen, et al., 2009).
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Lyft plans launch in Brooklyn and Queens and is halted by TLC, July, 2014. DRS
service Lyft planned to enter New York via the outer boroughs of Brooklyn and Queens.
It's launch date was set for Friday, July 11th. Days before the launch, the TLC sent out a
notice warning drivers that Lyft was not yet approved by the commission. The
commission's primary concern was city-licensed drivers working for Lyft as an
alternative (Huet, 2014). For taxicab drivers, the move between DRS services and
traditional taxis is often fluid. Many do not see one service as "better" or "worse" than
the other, but "different" in how the service can fulfill his or her needs at the moment.
Lyft reaches a complex deal with TLC to launch service in New York, July, 2015.
Two weeks after its anticipated launch in Brooklyn and Queens, Lyft received
permission from the TLC to launch in all five boroughs of the city. The stipulation,
however, was that all drivers had to be city-licensed by the TLC This varies from the
Lyft business model that depended on private individuals who could enter and leave the
Lyft platform without any regulatory requirements. Hence, New York City differs from
the San Francisco model where the state CPUC created a separate class for app-based
transportation, the TNC (Lawler, 2014). As of July, 2015, the TLC licensing requirement
along with a require that the vehicle have TLC license plates is still in effect (Lyft, 2015).
A Crash victim filed a lawsuit against driver and Uber, March, 2015. Erin Sauchelli,
a pedestrian seriously injured while in a crosswalk in Manhattan, filed a lawsuit against
Uber and the driver of the vehicle. Sauchelli's claim is that the Uber driver was distracted
by his app, a violation of New York State law. Sauchelli was walking in the crosswalk
with her boyfriend, Wesley Manning, who died at the scene. Unlike the wrongful death
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lawsuit of Sofia Liu in San Francisco, the driver was temporarily suspended and then
reinstated by Uber. The driver's TLC license was also suspended and reinstated (Aaron,
2015).
TLC proposes rules that would strengthen regulation of car-hailing apps like Uber
and Lyft, May, 2015. The TLC proposed new rules aimed at DRS services. The
regulatory agency's rules package included apps that will lock while vehicles are in
motion, requiring estimates of fares during surge pricing4.
4.4 Compare and Contrast
The following section compares and contrasts the chronologies of the legal and
administrative events that were recorded for San Francisco and New York. The
similarities and differences are presented to shed light on how DRS has evolved in two of
its most critical markets.
DRS status. The study reveals the difference in the status of DRS services in both cities.
Although the companies are the same, the rules they must navigate are different and
depend largely on the regulatory body whose jurisdiction they fall under. In the case of
San Francisco, DRS services benefit from their status as TNCs, a category created by the
CPUC, the state regulatory body with jurisdiction over passenger transportation
companies (California Public Utilities Commission, 2013b). A difference can also be

4

Surge Pricing is when rates increase based on demand. On their website, Uber explains the increase is to
ensure that there are enough drivers on the road during peak periods (e.g. sporting events, weather related,
holidays, etc.). Lyft has a similar policy called Prime Time. Both companies have faced criticism for this
policy, yet they defends using Surge Pricing and Prime Time stating that it puts more cars on the road
during the busiest periods (Davidson, 2015).
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noted in that the CPUC initially explored whether DRS services fell under its scope of
influence, unlike the New York TLC. TNC status preserves the intended nature of DRS,
which is ride sharing accessible to drivers who want to be matched with riders without
the need for livery licensing. However, in June, 2015, a judge for the California Labor
Commission ruled in favor of a driver in a case where Uber is required to compensate her
as an employee rather than an independent contractor (Huet, 2015). This ruling has
ramifications not only for California DRS drivers but may also be seen as a precedent
that other state labor commissions will follow. Many states have used the CPUC
category of TNC as a precedent to follow.

Indents should just be ½ inch

In New York, DRS services are influenced by the TLC. The regulatory body has
jurisdiction over all FHVs that operate in the city. Early on, the TLC was successful in
requiring Uber to follow city-licensing rules. Thus, companies like Uber, and more
recently Lyft, must access a pool of licensed TLC drivers. The drivers vehicles must also
carry TLC License plates (Lawler, 2014). This policy is unlike DRS services in San
Francisco where DRS drivers do not have to be licensed livery drivers.
Wrongful Death. Sofia Liu's death calls into question the structure of the insurance rules
created by the CPUC (Table 4.1). Uber has managed thus far to fight the rules
established in September, 2013 by the CPUC (California Public Utilities Commission,
2013c). The San Francisco case differs from the New York case in that although the
driver admits to using the Uber app at the time of the accident, Uber has been successful
in its argument that the driver was not performing Uber business, but using the GPS
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function of the app. Also, Uber contends in the San Francisco case that the driver is not
an employee, but an Uber software licensee. Uber also contends that the driver was not
carrying a passenger, or on his way to pick up a fare at the time of the crash (Williams,
2014).In NYC, the plaintiff is using the state's law against distracted driving, and also the
TLC's rule against using an electronic device while driving (Aaron, 2015).
Medallions. In San Francisco, medallions remain stable as the SFMTA sets the price
(Said, 2015). In New York, the medallion are treated as an investment instrument and are
tied to financial markets that set the price based on demand. Medallion transactions are
often handled by financial companies, such as Medallion Financial, a lender who handles
medallion sales (Grynbaum, 2011).
Cease and Desist orders. In San Francisco, the large DRS service are often positioned
well to legally challenge cease and desist order. In New York, cease and desist orders are
effective for smaller companies that lack resources to mount a legal battle, such as in the
cases involving SideCar and RelayRides (Chernova, 2013). The process for large
companies in New York, such as Uber and Lyft, is different. In the case of New York,
the regulatory body, the TLC, exercises much control directly over the licensed drivers.
It is common, therefore, as in the case of the Lyft launch in 2014, for the TLC to issue
warnings to drivers that discourage them from working for the DRS service. The
warnings can be interpreted as threats to losing one's license. Since DRS services must
choose a city-licensed driver, the pool of available drivers becomes too small. Hence, the
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DRS is forced to exit the market or capitulate to the demands of the TLC if they want to
conduct business in New York (Lawler, 2014).
4.5 Conclusion
Comparing and contrasting the city case histories chronologically was insightful to
instruct how DRS is evolving in two of the more influential markets in the nation. In San
Francisco, were modern ICT-enabled DRS began, there were ten events chronologically
recorded from 2010 to 2015. In New York, where regulation of the traditional taxi
industry began in 1937 with the Haas Act, there were nine events recorded.
In summary, events in San Francisco have moved quickly beginning with early
establishment of the major companies, i.e. Uber and Lyft, and early regulation and
defining of the DRS business model with the CPUC ruling on TNCs in 2013. The CPUC
ruling has also moved quickly to establish insurance rules for DRS services that have
been emulated in other U.S. cities. DRS in San Francisco has appeared to catch opposing
stakeholders off-guard and is on track laying the groundwork for this new transportation
service that is being launched in other states and municipalities.
Challenges such as the wrongful death of a pedestrian in the January 2014 lawsuit
pose more of a minor financial threat than one that is existential. With a valuation of
approximately $50 billion as of May, 2015, Uber is poised to be the world's most
valuable private start-up company, exceeding older established transportation companies
such as FedEx, last valued at $45 billion, and at Nissan Motor, with a capitalization of
$47 billion (Tam & de la Merced, 2015)
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TNCs have encountered an obstruction in San Francisco, however, with the recent
ruling by a California Labor Commission judge (Issac & Singer, 2015). The ruling states
that Uber's drivers are not independent contractors, but instead are employees of the
company based on how the company oversees the screening of drivers and setting of
prices for rides. Uber contends that the decision only applies to the single individual
name in the lawsuit (Wood, 2015). The legal chronology of this review ends with this
latest major event and is significant since the outcome will dictate whether the DRS
model will be encumbered with employees, a facet of earlier ridesharing models that
required elements of traditional businesses such as Zipcar (Sundararajan, 2013).
In New York, penetration of the urban transportation market has moved quickly
despite regulation by the city's TLC. The regulatory agency was quick to claim
jurisdiction over DRS services and used modifications to existing rules to incorporate
city-licensed drivers into the disruption of the medallion-based taxicab industry. The
New York yellow taxi medallion hit a historic high of $1.3 million in April 2013 and has
dropped in value to approximately $840,000 as of March 2015 (Caruthers, 2015).
Hence, in New York, DRS has adapted to the existing regulatory environment at
the expense of the medallion. system. In the case of New York, more research will be
required to determine the ramifications of a collapse of the medallion system and which
parties stand to benefit from such change.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and recommendations
5. Introduction
The research set out to explore the current state and directions of dynamic
ridesharing (DRS), specifically within the United States. DRS can be traced back to the
early car sharing clubs of World War II, and ultimately to present-day Internet-enabled
and location-aware DRS. Earlier iterations of ridesharing were usually an employer or
government sponsored endeavors. The organizational involvement of employers and
government agencies were necessary to initiate matches between drivers and riders. As
ridesharing progressed, telecommunications were used in conjunction with early Internet
technology to deliver reliable matching of drivers and riders (Saddiqi & Buliung, 2013).
With the wide public acceptance of smartphones and social media websites such as
Facebook and Twitter, ridesharing had the final components necessary to allow real-time
matching (Amey, Attanucci, & Mishalani, 2011).
Chapter 2 gave the history of DRS as it relates to its previous iterations, i.e.
carpools, and ridesharing. The review states what is new about DRS, which is mainly, its
departure from the traditional disciplines of transportation engineering and planning.
Both disciplines have had primary roles in applying Transportation Demand Management
strategies to reduce single-occupant vehicle use by shifting drivers to high-occupancy
modes such as carpooling and mass transit (Black & Schreffler, 2010).
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The research revealed what is happening in a selection of cities where this
emerging innovation is being allowed to play itself out. For example, in San Francisco,
the origination point of DRS, regulators were comparatively quick to set mandatory rules
regarding how driver records, criminal background checks, vehicle safety inspections,
and insurance issues were to be addressed. The California Public Utilities Commission
(CPUC) became the state agency with jurisdiction over the newly created Transportation
Network Companies (TNCs), the name used to describe DRS platforms that used
smartphones and Internet technology to match riders with drivers (California Public
Utilities Commission, 2013). In New York, the birthplace of the medallion system,, there
are now more Uber vehicles than yellow taxis according to the city's Taxi and Limousine
Commission, the municipal agency charged with jurisdiction over all for-hire-vehicles
(FHVs) (Pramuk, 2015). A Chapter 4 review of these two premier cities revealed that
establishment of the major DRS platforms, Uber, Lyft, and SideCar, has been fraught
with legal issues that threaten their continued operation. Examination of the two cities
also revealed who is involved in this new form of urban transportation. Aside from the
primary stakeholders, i.e. the DRS platforms' management, regulatory agencies, and taxi
and limousine labor groups, a large part of the driving force has been broad consumer
acceptance of the enabling technologies that make real-time ridesharing possible.
Chapter 3 examined who are the users of DRS. A summary of the national survey
of 306 respondents shows striking homogeneity among the users who were riders. They
are predominately White, college educated, and from households with high incomes.
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Recommendations based on these findings indicate further research needed to determine
the implications that this elite group has on the future direction of urban transportation.
5.1 Limitations of the study
The study opens the view of the challenge of urban transportation that is
continuous. Urban transportation has been evolving in the American city through much
of the Industrial Age. As cities grow, the challenge becomes more complex. An
indication of the complexity is the study's singular focus on transportation. It does not
address other urban systems such as water, energy, and waste disposal.
Based on the research presented, change is coming to transportation, yet no one
can yet predict how to manage the change. For example, in the case of Uber, Lyft, and
SideCar drivers are independent contractors who set their work hours based on personal
preference. The status of the independent contractor is fraught with legal ramifications
that are presently being played out in the U.S. courts (Wood, 2015). As cities grow and
become centers of activity without restriction to time-of-day, the independent contractor
nature of DRS will present challenges to populations that will require transportation
during non-peak hours. Already, monetary restrictions on the operation of public
transportation systems reduce access during a period of low ridership.
Limitations of the study also do not answer why DRS is spreading rapidly from
one city to the next and displacing traditional urban fixtures such as taxicabs. The study
offered only what is happening in cities and who is involved.
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5.2 Recommendations
This DRS study was an introduction to a technology that is used by a crosssection of the urban population that uses a public service that is privately financed. In its
present state, the technology is used by individuals who have the financial means to pay
for the service. This has been confirmed by the survey in Chapter 3 of the study. The
survey points to a national sample of individuals who can use DRS. The use of DRS by
this elite group is based on their self-interest. Their elite status is defined primarily by
the survey's responses that show users who are highly educated, i.e. graduate school
level, and earning incomes above $200,000 per household. This self-interest by this
group is in direct conflict with the larger public who do not have the means to use DRS
because they are handicapped by lower incomes.
Lower income groups, however, are not totally removed from participation in the
new technology. They are often the drivers of vehicles who are earning income through
registration with DRS platforms. Participation by lower income users may be short-lived
as further advancements in technology continue and contribute to the convergence of the
automobile and information technology industries.
Like elevator operators of the past century, FHV drivers may become
anachronistic with continued advancements in driverless technology. Presently, Uber is
partnering with Google and Carnegie Mellon University to work on mapping technology,
safety, and autonomous vehicles. A partnership of Uber and Carnegie Mellon University
call the Advanced Technologies Center was announced in February 2015 (Uber, 2015).
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The partnership, based in Pittsburgh, will focus primarily on the development of an Uber
vehicle that will pickup and drop off passengers autonomously. The ramifications of
driverless vehicle technology are enormous and will impact not only transportation but
labor, as well as more human-based employment, is lost to the roboticization of the
economy (Winker & Macmillan, 2015).
Recommendation for future research is also made based on the pilot study of
Chapter 4 that looked at the two premier cities, San Francisco and New York. The pilot
study used legal and administrative reports to examine how DRS works in two large
cities. Further research is needed to investigate how the DRS process repeats itself in
cities of 100,000 with an exponential increase to 1 million. The research would be based
on Raymond Murphy's study of the American central business district that was an urban
geography study that attempted to delimit the physical boundaries of the city's downtown
(Murphy, 1973). By delimitation of the boundaries within which DRS is successful it is
hoped that a metric could be developed for determining where to use the service. The
metric determining boundary delimitations could have application in establishing whether
DRS works everywhere, and especially if it works in smaller cities.
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